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ABSTRACT
Buyer Beware: Consumer Response to Manipulations of Online Product Reviews
by
ZHUANG Mengzhou
Master of Philosophy
Online product reviews have become an important and influential source of
information for consumers. Firms often manipulate online product reviews to
influence consumer perceptions about the product, making it a research topic of
urgent need for theory development and empirical investigation. In this thesis, we
examine how consumers perceive and respond to the three commonly used
manipulation tactics. Firstly, an exploratory pre-study via in-depth interviews with
online shoppers indicates that consumers commonly have the knowledge for online
review manipulations as well as for detecting them. In the first study, a survey was
used to investigate the three popular manipulation tactics in terms of ethicality and
deceptiveness. They rated hiding/deleting unfavorable messages as the most
deceptive and unethical, followed by anonymously adding positive messages, and
then offering incentives for posting favorable messages. In study 2, in a simulated
field experiment, we introduce persuasion knowledge to further examine the negative
influence of review manipulations on consumers’ attitudes. The results suggest that
review manipulation increases suspicion of manipulations but can hardly reduce
purchase intention of focal products. We also find that consumers’ persuasion
knowledge enhances suspicion of manipulation, but lessens the negative impact of
suspicion on purchase intention. The third study uses secondary data of a branded
e-retailer and its third party website to cross-validate the effect of manipulations on
product sales. The results confirm our hypotheses that review manipulation are
effective in promoting sales; however, this influence would decrease over time.
This research contributes to the online marketing literature by augmenting the
Information Manipulation Theory and Persuasion Knowledge Model to examine the
deceptive persuasion in the online context and its impact on consumer behavior.
Furthermore, we also contribute to the literature of online WOM by empirically
examining the influence of review manipulations on sales. Our findings provide
valuable insights to practitioners and policy makers on the pitfalls of online
manipulation activities and the need to ensure the healthy development of

e-commerce.
Key Words: Online Review Manipulation; Persuasion Knowledge Model;
Information Manipulation Theory
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Definition
There is growing evidence that consumers are influenced by online product
reviews when making a variety of purchase decisions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006;
Cui et al., 2012; Sen and Lerman, 2007; Senecal and Nantel, 2004). The recent rise in
online word-of-mouth is dramatically changing the world of marketing. To reduce the
information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, systems such as user rating, user
recommendation and discussing groups are introduced to encourage experienced
consumers to express their opinions. These tools help the inexperienced individuals
to evaluate the focal products, eventually, ameliorate the information asymmetry in
online shopping context.
However, evidence suggests that online WOM may be intentionally manipulated
by interested groups such as retailers, manufacturers and competitors to influence
consumers’ evaluations (Dellarocas, 2006). For example, in February 2004,
Amazon.com’s Canadian website mistakenly revealed the identities of the book
reviewers, and people found out that a great proportion of reviews and ratings were
posted by the book’s publishers, authors or its competitors (Harmon, 2004).
Multinational companies such as Bayer, Levi’s, Starwood Hotels, Mazda, KFC and
Kraft have all employed buzz techniques for their products to influence consumers’
purchase decisions (Mayzlin, 2006). If one carefully examines the review system of
famous e-retailers such as Amazon.com, people may find cues of manipulation such
as fraud reviews. An example is shown in Figure 1. It is obvious that consumer
whose ID is “ATVPDKIKXDDER” continuously posted extremely positive reviews
(5-star reviews) to a single product within a week.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
Other than posting fraudulent reviews, monetary incentives and deleting negative
WOM are also commonly adopted methods of review manipulation. For instance, the
publisher Elsevier offered people $25 gift cards for positive reviews of textbooks
(Northrup, 2009). In exchange of a monthly fee, Yelp allegedly offered to move a
business’s negative reviews to the bottom of its Yelp page, where users cannot easily
access (Morrison, 2011). A few e-commerce and forum operators, such as Amazon
and Yelp, have installed sophisticated algorithms to detect and filter out the fake
reviews, while businesses are rallying against such practices, which may remove
1

some totally legitimate and authentic reviews (Morrison, 2011).
By definition, review manipulators could be vendors or other interested groups
who intentionally manipulate the online reviews information in order to boost the
sales of their products (Dellarocas, 2006; Hu et al., 2012). Broadly speaking,
manipulations could be categorized into three types—(1) anonymously posting
promotional messages (we refer as adding), (2) Hiding or deleting unfavorable
messages (we refer to as deleting), and (3) offering incentives to consumers who post
favorable reviews (we refer to as incentives) (Dellarocas, 2006; Mayzlin, 2006; Hu et
al., 2011a). Even though other variations such as posting fake negative reviews to
competitors’ products may also be considered as review manipulation, the core idea
is to increase the retailer’s own relative average rating, i.e., decreasing competitors’
average rating in order to make one’s own products more competitive. As our focus is
on the manipulations by retailers to influence consumers, we would exclude the
manipulations of reviews among competitors in our study. By adopting these
manipulator-consumer strategies, manipulators could either increase the average
WOM rating or decrease the amount of negative information.
In a short term, firms may benefit from review manipulations: the increased
ratings induce consumers to generate inaccurate products evaluations. Comparing
with the short-term profits, the long-term consequences are damaging. From the
perspective of firms, online review manipulations lower the credibility of retailers
and start the “rat race” among competitors in the whole industry (Dellarocas, 2006).
From the perspective of consumers, manipulated reviews lead them to make
suboptimal choices, and further distrust online WOM (Mayzlin et al., 2013).
Therefore, firms as well as society would be better off there is no manipulation at all,
and how to eliminate the influence of the review manipulations is important for both
consumers and policy makers.
In this thesis, focusing on these issues, we examine the effects of online review
manipulation from the perspective from (1) the distinctions among different
manipulation strategies, (2) consumers’ response to review manipulations and (3)
effectiveness of review manipulations. In addition, managerial implications would be
raised both for managers and the market regulators.
1.2 Study Rationale
How consumers respond to online review manipulations is one of the most
2

interesting and important issues, especially when online review manipulations
become popular in e-market. Manipulated reviews generally distort the information
in user-generated contents (UGC), which induce consumers to make less beneficial
choices. These distortions may increase sales and product evaluations that are
profitable to the sellers, whereas the sellers may also suffer from consequences such
as credit loss. Although evidences show that review manipulations become
increasingly popular among retailers, related regulations or laws are remained to be
established, making it a worthy research topic. Previous research focuses on only
specific categories such as fake reviews (Kornish, 2009; Hu et al., 2011a, 2011b,
2012; Mayzlin et al., 2013) and paid reviews (Stephen et al., 2012). However,
interesting questions could still be asked and remained to be explored: Are all kinds
of manipulation equally effective in increasing sales? Would consumers dislike some
tactics more than others? These questions should be of great importance for sellers to
realize of the potential pitfalls of manipulations and for policy makers to minimize
the damage of such deceptive activities.
One of the key issues should be consumers’ attitudes toward different
manipulation tactics. The three popular manipulation tactics relate to different aspects
of online reviews. To the specific, the strategy of “anonymously adding positive
reviews” mainly deals with fake positive reviews to increase the rating and the
volume of reviews, while the “hide/delete negative reviews” strategy eliminates the
reviews that are unfavorable to the manipulators and therefore increase the average
rating but decrease the volume of reviews; the third method “offering incentives to
the reviews who post positive reviews” increases the rating by intentionally inducing
consumers to post “better” reviews than they should have posted. Previous literature
suggests that, according to their emphasis on different information, consumers may
disparately evaluate the three types of manipulations and the differentiations are
crucial to the successful implementation of review manipulations (e.g. Johnson et al.,
1993; Robinson, 1996; Robinson and Morrison, 2000; Johnson et al., 2001). In our
study, we would like to clarify the diversifications of consumers’ attitudes toward
different manipulation tactics.
Figuring out consumers’ knowledge and reactions should be another intriguing
topic. Previous literature shows that consumers, especially experienced ones, have
the capability to tell deceptions from facts (e.g. Biros et al., 2002). However, different
3

from the traditional context, online review manipulations are 1) non-interpersonal:
the message senders are not one specific person but several individuals including
retailers and other consumers and 2) low media-richness: the messages could only be
transmitted through low-richness media such as texts and figures which contains only
verbal information. Due to the characters of online communication, clarifying how
consumers behave when encountering review manipulation in such a context should
be interesting and important.
The third important issue is to empirically examine the effectiveness of review
manipulations as a marketing strategy. Prior literature has empirically investigated
the situations where manipulations are most likely to occur (Hu et al., 2012; Mayzlin
et al., 2013). In the perspective of manipulators and policy makers, the impacts of
review manipulations on products sales should also be of great value to them.
Although evidences show that review manipulations are popular among e-tailers, no
such empirical evidences show that review manipulations are well-performed as a
marketing strategy. Therefore, we would also like to empirically investigate the
relationship between manipulation intensity and sales of products.
To sum up, even though prior research mainly cover the issues such as why
retailers manipulate product reviews and who are most likely to be the manipulators,
limited research directly examine the topic from the perspectives we mentioned
above. To more specifically analyze the topic of review manipulations, we would
further investigate it from several unexplored aspects in order to provide insightful
implications for both practitioners and academic researchers.
1.3 Research Objectives
In this research, we mainly want to answer the following questions: (1) Are all
types of manipulations indifferently considered? (2) How consumers react to these
behaviors? (3) How does review manipulation perform as a marketing strategy? By
answering the three questions, we would significantly contribute to the literature in
areas such as Information Manipulation Theory, Persuasion Knowledge Model and
online review manipulations. These contributions are expected to provide valuable
insight to practitioners and policy makers on the pitfalls of manipulations and to
ensure the healthy development of e-commerce.
Firstly, we extend a framework of Information Manipulation Theory (IMT),
which distinguishes deceptive messages, to the context of review manipulation.
4

Information Manipulation Theory offers a multidimensional approach to understand
deceptive message. While most of the IMT research mainly focuses on the traditional
interpersonal deceptions, no research examined its validity in the online situation.
With IMT, we would be able to differentiate the three popular tactics in terms of
deceptiveness and ethicality.
Secondly, we also introduce Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) into
manipulation responses. Persuasion Knowledge Model refers to consumers’ intuitive
theories or beliefs about how marketers try to influence them, and under certain
conditions, they use these beliefs to counter persuasion attempts (Friestad and Wright,
1994). Here we not only considered that persuasion knowledge could explain how
manipulated reviews arouse negative emotions, but also documented how they
appropriately cope with suspicious reviews and adjust their attitudes.
Finally, given the empirical data, we also explore the performances of review
manipulations on product sales. We seek out supporting evidence for the facts that
increased ratings would promote sales of products and the correlations over time.
Managerial implications are raised to help managers and policy makers to further
understand review manipulations. Through understanding consumers’ views and
responses toward review manipulations, we point out several useful implications for
the practitioners and regulators as to minimize the consequences of such behaviors.
1.4 Thesis Organization
In the thesis we attempt to explore online attitudes and influences of product
review manipulations. The thesis is organized as follows: in chapter 1 we introduce
the background knowledge, research rationale and the objectives of our research. In
chapter 2, we review prior literature in online WOM, review manipulations, unethical
marketing behaviors and online deception detection. An exploratory study of
consumers’ attitudes and views toward manipulations are included in chapter 3. In
chapter 4, theoretical framework would be presented and testable hypotheses are
raised. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, the designs and results of three empirical studies are
presented to test our hypotheses. Finally, general discussion, managerial implications,
limitations and future research directions are included in chapter 8.

5

Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 The Influence of Online Reviews
From the traditional brick-and-mortar environment to the updated multi-channel
environment, Word-of-Mouth is long perceived as an important indicator of product
sales and brand reputation. Information of online reviews contains several
dimensions as rating (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006), volume of reviews (Duan et al.,
2008) and variance (Godes and Mayzlin, 2004). Academic researchers have
examined online WOM from the perspectives of online product reviews on product
sales and marketing strategies (e.g., Chen and Xie, 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Chevalier
and Mayzlin, 2006; Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Forman et al., 2008; Ghose and
Iperiotis, 2010; Cui et al., 2012), the usefulness of online reviews for decision
making (e.g. Sen and Lerman, 2007; Smith et al., 2005; Zhu and Zhang, 2010), the
value of online consumer reviews in sales forecasting (e.g. Dellarocas et al., 2007;
Dhar and Chang, 2009), and consumers’ motivations for reviews posting
(Hennig-Thurau et al., 2004; Moldovan et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011). The literature
has suggested that 1) consumers increasingly depend on online product reviews to
make purchase decisions, thus the quality and trustfulness of reviews available to
read is important, and 2) the dimensions of online WOM information are correlates
with product sales and suggest a great indicating or predicting power on new product
sales.
However, researchers also found contradictory results for WOM rating.
Neelamegham and Chintagunta (1999) examined the relationship between WOM and
box revenue but no significant correlation was found. Liu (2006) suggested that

if

the volume and rating are all considered, the amount of WOM accounts for
mosexplanatory power of both aggregate and weekly box revenue, while rating is not
a significant factor. Duan et al. (2008) also found that, after solving the endogeneity
of WOM rating, the volume had better explanatory power than the rating. All these
references show that explanatory power of WOM rating on sales is limited if other
factors are considered.
People believe that the efficacy of rating could nonetheless be limited. First,
WOM rating could only represent consumers’ preferences, therefore average rating
could only be a predictor but not a significantly influencer to the revenue (Eliashberg
and Shugan, 1997). Second, reviews are posted with the personal biases and,
6

therefore, the attitudes of the majority cannot be accurately represented. In traditional
WOM, extremely satisfied and dissatisfied customers are more likely to initiate
WOM transfers (Anderson, 1998). Similar results are also found that “the pool of
review” is mostly dominated by polarized reviewers, while neutralized consumers
tend not to make contributions (Moe and Trusov, 2011), and that average ratings
fluctuate as most of late posters are consumers with negative biases (Li and Hitt,
2008). Third, the efficacy of rating varies across different conditions. Previous
studies suggested that WOM rating is more influential for the sales of less popular
products (Zhu and Zhang, 2010) and for the late revenues (Reinstein and Snyder,
2005; Zhang and Dellarocas, 2006). Fourth, review manipulations may also influence
the validity of review ratings. Interested groups intentionally manipulate the reviews
in case that the negative reviews would hurt the sales of focal products, and therefore
decrease the effectiveness of WOM rating (Dellarocas, 2006). As a result, these
biases increase consumers’ uncertainty about the product reviews (Zhao et al., 2013).
To avoid the risk, consumers heavily discount their reliance on the online WOM
before making decisions.
2.2 Online Review Manipulation
Online review manipulations are commonly used as marketing strategies in
e-market, but direct evidence of manipulation cannot be easily obtained.
Manipulators can hardly be identified and are afraid of confessing their unethical
behaviors. Due to these difficulties, the early researchers mostly focus on analytical
models and fraud review detection. The topic of online review is first explored by
two analytical research which takes an initial step in finding the impact of online
manipulation of product reviews on consumers and the firm using analytical models
(Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, 2006). Mayzlin (2006) built a game theory model in
which two competing firms send anonymous messages praising their own product.
She found an equilibrium that online WOM remains persuasive despite the
promotional chat activity by competing firms, and inferior products are more likely to
enjoy promotional chats. Dellarocas (2006) also analytically showed that fraudulent
reviews are especially popular in certain conditions, and that manipulation could be
beneficial by differentiating superior products with the inferior ones (inferior
products are more manipulated). But in long run, manipulation would be detrimental
to firms and the whole society. These two analytical works suggested that, even
7

review manipulation could be beneficial in specific contexts, its long-term
consequences to the health development of e-market are serious and harmful.
Although direct evidence of manipulation is not accessible to most of academic
researchers, the category of posting fake reviews are empirically studied by sentiment
analysis, review distribution and proxies (Hu et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Kornish,
2009; Mayzlin et al., 2013). Kornish (2009) developed three fake review distribution
models and analyzed 5 sets of field data. The results document that fake review
manipulation is not commonly dominant but still prevalent in some data sources. Hu
et al. (2011a) analyzed the tendency of rating and attributed the decrease in rating
overtime to review manipulations in early stage instead of bias in late reviews. They
also found that the amount of manipulation correlates with the quality of the product
and consumers could only partially correct the influence of rating manipulation. In
another paper, Hu et al. (2011b) adopted the ratio of rating variance as proxy of
manipulation. The analysis indicates that, in book market of Amazon.com, books of
non-bestsellers with less helpful reviews, of higher retailing price and of high
popularity are more likely to engage in fake reviews. In 2012, Hu et al. again used
sentiment analysis to detect manipulation in review content, and the results indicated
that consumers are only able to detect numerical manipulation (rating and volume)
but not literal manipulations. Mayzlin et al. (2013) conducted an empirical research
with difference-in-difference approach, in which they collected review data from 2
hotel-booking websites. They concluded that independent hotels are more likely to
engage in fake positive review, while hotels with high-manipulation-incentive
neighbors are more likely to suffer intentional negative reviews. The five empirical
studies all focused on the manipulation strategy of adding fake reviews (positive,
negative or both) and claimed that 1) fake reviews are prevent in different platforms,
and 2) consumers can only partially detect theses deceptive reviews.
The influence of offering incentives to positive review posters is also
investigated. Stephen and his colleagues (2012) found that disclosure of review
payments induce doubts in product quality and decreases consumers’ expectations
about product quality. This paper attempts to distinguish itself from previous studies
on seller manipulations by theoretically and empirically investigating the impact of
different manipulation strategies might have on the consumers.
In sum, most of the research on review manipulations limited their definitions of
8

manipulation to manipulations such as posting fake reviews or offering incentives,
and previous studies mostly focused on manipulation detection, characters of
manipulators and persuasion of reviews.
2.3 Deceptive Practices in Marketing
Deception is an intentional or deliberate act that is accomplished by
manipulating information in some way (Masip et al., 2004). Deceptive practices in
marketing revealed in prior research mainly focused on the area of personal selling
and advertising. Unethical personal sales tactics are defined as short-run salespersons’
conducts that enable them to gain at the expense of the customer (Román and Ruiz,
2005). Examples of such activities include lying or exaggerating about the benefits of
a product, availability, and the competition; selling products that people do not need;
giving answers when the answer is not really known; and implementing manipulative
influence tactics or high-pressure selling techniques (Lagace et al., 1991; Robertson
and Anderson, 1993). As defined by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US,
advertisements are deceptive if they are 1) factually incorrect; 2) subject to multiple
interpretations, one of which is false; 3) guilty of omitting relevant information; 4)
true, but the proof is false; 5) “literally” true but creates a false impression (Cohen,
1974). Both deceptive personal selling and deceptive advertising are illegal or
morally unacceptable to the larger community (Jones, 1991). Previous studies have
shown that they would decrease customer long-term satisfaction and brand loyalty
(Darke et al., 2007; Román and Ruiz, 2005; Burke et al., 1988).
With the advent of e-commerce, the potential of new Internet technologies to
mislead or deceive consumers has increased considerably. Xiao and Benbasat (2011)
defined product-related e-commerce deceptive information practices as “the
deliberate manipulation of product-related information perpetrated by online
merchants to mislead consumers in order to induce desired attitudinal and behavioral
changes in consumers” and “the changes are detrimental to consumers and beneficial
to the merchants”. The anonymity of the Internet has made it a fertile ground for
deception. The digital environment lowers the effort for online companies to create
and change information content as well as to manipulate the presentation and
production of such information content in order to achieve deception. A few scholars
demonstrate that individuals

can manipulate the content of information

simultaneously along several different dimensions such as completeness, clarity, and
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veridicality, which correspond to the three deception types namely concealment,
equivocation, and falsification, respectively (McCornack, 1992; Buller and Burgoon,
1996). By altering the availability and quality of information, online companies can
manipulate the online product reviews at an e-commerce website so as to enhance
consumers’ evaluation of those particular products. These activities involve unethical
marketing behaviors or even online deceptions that induce buyers to make
suboptimal purchase decisions and long-termly, they may lead to negative
consequences such as losses in reputation and consumer trustfulness.
2.4 Deception Detection
If review manipulations are unethical and harmful, then whether consumers are
able to avoid being deceived should be of great importance for the manipulators and
policy makers. Signal Detection Theory suggested that individuals would notice the
deceptions through signals (i.e. cues of deceptions) (Davies and Parasuraman, 1982).
To be specific, information that is tempered by manipulation of its content,
presentation, and/or generation might provide a signal that could be received by the
information receivers and activate their suspicion (Biros et al., 2002). The theory also
specifies four possible outcomes that could be extended to deception detection: Hit
(consumers detect deception when it does exist), Miss (consumers fail to detect
deception when it does exist), False Alarm (consumers report deception when it does
not exist) and Correct Rejection (consumers do not report deception when it does not
exist). The two-dimension framework provides a theoretical background for the
research in detection outcomes.
In terms of detection, the theory of deception detection provides a more specific
theoretical framework for further research in deception detection (Johnson et al.,
1993; Johnson et al., 2001). It suggests that, to be successful detectors, individuals
must 1) possess necessary domain knowledge and skills in recognizing deception
cues, 2) be sensitive to the possibility of deception (so as to generate deception
hypothesis), and 3) have effective means to evaluate the generated hypothesis. The
theory also concludes 4 cognitive procedures in fraud detection: Activation,
inconsistency of the expectation and true value would lead individuals to label the
cues as deception; Hypothesis generation, detectors generate hypotheses to explain
the inconsistency; Hypothesis evaluation, assess the hypotheses on the basis of their
materiality; Global assessment, combines all accepted hypotheses and produces a
10

final outcome. Previous study shows that competence at evaluating hypotheses is a
critical differentiator between successful and unsuccessful detector, and the better
performed detectors rely more on “assurance cues” rather than “trust” cues (Grazioli,
2004).
What method could increase detecting accuracy is also one of the key issues.
Biros et al. (2002) studied the effectiveness of traditional detection training and
in-time warning. The results showed that warnings lead to higher detection rate than
training, and if combined, detection success rate would be significantly increased.
Zhou and Zhang (2007) studied the relationship between the communication media
and deception detection. They documented that, in contrast to deception through
typing mode, information through messaging is more likely to be detected and that
media modality has significant impact on users’ satisfaction and information
usefulness. Román (2010) studied the relational consequences of perceived deception
in online shopping. He found a significant negative relationship between deception
and consumer loyalty, which is mediated by consumer satisfaction. Xiao and
Benbasat (2011) systematically reviewed the literature in online deception detection
and proposed a framework for future study. This paper presents a typology of
product-related deceptive information practices that illustrates the various ways to
deceive consumers via product websites. It also develops a model addressing why
consumers are deceived by deceptive information and factors contribute to
deceptions detection.
To conclude, by reviewing literature in online review, review manipulations,
unethical marketing behaviors and fraud detection, we know that 1) online reviews
are critical references to shoppers and also crucial in maintaining reputations, 2)
review manipulations are adopted by interest groups, 3) deceptive marketing
practices are more likely to occur online and are comparatively more difficult to
detect, and 4) consumers could detect manipulations and adjust their reliance on the
suspicious information source. However, in the review manipulation perspective
barely had any researchers adopted the consumers’ perspective to further investigate
the consequence of manipulations. In this thesis, we would like to explore the
influence of review manipulations from the aspect of the victims and provide
insightful implications to the e-market practitioners.
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Chapter 3 Exploratory Study: How Consumers View Review Manipulation
As discussed in chapter 2 that limited research has concentrated on consumers’
views and reactions toward review manipulations. Understanding consumers’
knowledge, views and their countering strategies is important: what do they know
about strategies? Whether consumers are able to recognize such schemes? Are the
three commonly used manipulation categories treated all the same or totally different?
In contrast to the context of traditional unethical/deceptive marketing behaviors,
consumers are now receiving verbal messages not only from retailers but also from
anonymous “buyers”, which may challenge the validity of the results from prior
studies.
An exploratory study that investigates consumers’ knowledge and attitudes will
be helpful to our theoretical development, as it provides updated and objective points
of views of the topic we want to study. An in-depth interview probing consumers’
knowledge and opinions toward different types of review manipulations were
conducted. This procedure provides us necessary background information and
examines the validity of the existed theories under the context of our target topic.
3.1 Participants and Procedures
An in-depth interview was conducted in February 2013 with 16 online shoppers
from Hong Kong and mainland China. China is an example of country where online
shopping industry keeps rapid development and gradually come into the mature stage.
Chinese online shoppers are interesting as they represent an emerging market where
online shopping is starting to its gain momentum. McKinsey’s (2013) report shows
that China has become the world’s second-largest e-tailing market in 2011, reaching
US$120 billion in sales. The largest online marketplace operators (e.g., domestic
firms such as Taobao, Tmall, and Paipai; multinationals such as e-Bay and Amazon)
account for an enormous share of the Chinese e-tailing market. Taobao alone had
more than six million registered sellers by the latest count, and together they generate
hundreds of millions of product listings. According to data released in the China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)’s “2012 China Online Shopping
Market Research Report”, China’s online shopping user base has reached 242 million
and gross merchandise volume reached RMB 1.26 trillion.
In this study, information-rich cases were chosen by combining intensity
sampling, maximum variation sampling, and snowball sampling (Patton, 2002). Via
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the researchers’ own social network, sixteen online shoppers (eleven females and five
males) aged from 23 to 44 were recruited. All interviewees have substantive online
shopping experience, with more than 5 times of purchase in the past three months and
the amount of spending ranging from three thousand to hundreds of thousands RMB.
To avoid online shopper similarity owing to snowball sampling, variation was sought
by considering age, gender, occupation, home district, and the shopping websites.
The shoppers do not necessarily shop at the same websites. As we assured their
anonymity, all the sixteen shoppers were willing to take part in the interview. The
in-depth interviews were conducted by the authors following a discussion guide (as
attached in the Appendix A). The interview guide is continually revised to reflect
emergent questions and issues. To expedite data collection, we collected data from
the first group of 4 qualified online shoppers, while continuing to scout for the
second suitable group of 4 shoppers. Thus it is envisaged that eight interviews were
completed at the first stage, before conducting the other 8 interviews at the second
stage. Under this arrangement, we had time to check for the applicability of new
insights gained from the previous cases.
After some background questions about the Internet usage and online shopping
experience, a thematic interview was conducted on shoppers’ awareness, suspicion,
detection and evaluation of different manipulation tactics, using indirect questioning
techniques adapted from the Voice of the Customer (Griffin and Hauser, 1993).
Interviews varied in length from 30 minutes to 90 minutes, averaging about 40
minutes per interviewee.
3.2 Data Analysis
The grounded theory approach has been widely used to the research questions
about (1) the nature of a new construct, (2) the adequacy of prior conceptualizations
of a relatively well established construct, (3) previously unrecognized facilitators or
implications of a construct and (4) adequacy of prior conceptualizations of facilitators
or implications of a construct (Fischer and Otnes, 2007). We adopt the grounded
theory approach, as the study involves the development of a theoretical framework
through the analysis of qualitative data. Our guiding question is “what do seller
manipulations of online product reviews mean to consumers?” which falls into the
first category of the research questions that the grounded theory approach can
address.
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According to Spiggle (1994), qualitative data analysis involves the techniques of
categorization, abstraction, comparison, integration and iteration, which are the
fundamental analytical operations to enable the construction of a coherent conceptual
framework or explanation. The first step of the analysis is to classify and label the
units of data during the process of coding, and then is to identify the patterns in the
data and group them into more general, conceptual classes. Comparison and pattern
matching are conducted in a systematic way to explore the differences and
similarities across incidents within the data currently collected, and this process will
provide guidelines for future quantitative studies.
Following the guidelines from Spiggle (1994), the interviews were recorded and
transcribed. The transcripts were reviewed twice to uncover key themes (Miles and
Huberman, 1984) by two members of the research team. After transcribing the
interviews,

the

procedure

of

categorization,

abstraction,

comparison,

dimensionalization and integration was followed. All passages of text that involved a
reference to awareness, suspicion, detection and evaluation of manipulation practices
were highlighted and tabulated by case (i.e., for each shopper, list all incidents that
represent the construct) and by construct (i.e., for each construct, list all incidents that
represent the construct across cases). This analytical procedure promotes a systematic
back-and-forth movement through the data, uncovering all possible leads. Finally the
results were aggregated to seek patterns in meanings.
3.3 Results and Discussion
In this section, we describe and discuss the main findings on 1) awareness of the
occurrence of online manipulation, 2) suspicion and detection of different
manipulation tactics, and 3) evaluation of different online manipulation practices.
Other findings that pertain to these are also reported. Example quotes are provided in
summary tables. We refer to the citations of their comments as from the interviewee
ID, i.e., F1 for female No. 1, and M2 for male No. 2.
3.3.1

Awareness of the Occurrence of Review Manipulations

We explored consumers’ awareness of the commonly used manipulation tactics
by asking interviewees whether they know about any tactics that would be used to
manipulate the online product reviews. The results are shown in Table 1. It suggests
that adding positive reviews (mentioned by 9 interviewees) and using incentive to
encourage positive reviews (mentioned by 8 interviewees) have a higher level of
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awareness among interviewees. Deleting negative reviews are mentioned by only 3
interviewees, suggesting that it is more disguised and less known by consumers.
Interviewees use their own language to describe the nature of different manipulation
tactics.
(Insert Table 1 here)
As shown in Table 1, the three commonly used manipulation tactics are
described as (1) Incentive manipulation: an online company encourages consumers to
create positive product reviews by offering some type of incentives (e.g., discounts,
special offers, cash rebate or gifts). (2) Adding manipulation: online sellers ask
someone (e.g., employees, associates, close friends, acquaintances and even
professional shill reviewers) pose as consumers and anonymously post fake positive
reviews to their own products even though they may not really have bought or used
the product. (3) Deleting manipulation: online companies intentionally delete and
block unfavorable reviews of their products from the readers, or even edit them to
become positive, with the assistance of the website administrator, if it is not on the
seller’s own website.
The fact that fewer consumers are aware of deleting manipulation than of
incentive and adding manipulation may be due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, a
variety of administrative measures are taken by shopping platforms such as Taobao
and Tmall to prevent the practice of deleting any product reviews. These regulations
further boost the implementation cost of deleting manipulation and consumers are
less likely to exposure to deleting tactic. Thus, consumers have lower chance to be
aware of the high-cost manipulation strategy. Second, the concealment of information
is considered as the type of deception, which is the most difficultly to be detected
(Xiao and Benbasat, 2011). Comparatively, product reviews with deleting
manipulation disclose the least amount of cues, and the direct evidence of
manipulation may also be the hardest to obtain. Lack of detecting capability may also
significantly limit consumers’ chance to recognize the manipulation tactic, and then,
limit their awareness or knowledge about the manipulation.
3.3.2

Detection of Different Tactics

Interviewees were asked the extent to which they suspect the occurrences of the
review manipulations. Among the 16 online shoppers, except one does not suspect
the credibility of the reviews at all, most of them claimed that they were moderately
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or extremely suspicious of review manipulations. They were then probed the cues,
signals and information used for detection.
From the interviews, consumers seem to have sufficient knowledge and
capability to separate the genuine reviews from the fake ones. As summarized in
Table 2, the tricks and cues could be categorized into 4 types: 1) the quality of
content, 2) the quantity of the reviews, 3) the mismatch between reviews, seller
reputation and the trade record, and 4) the identities of the reviewers. Interviewees
gave detailed descriptions of the cues they use to detect manipulated reviews. First,
unbalanced distribution of positive vs. negative reviews certainly raises a flag in the
mind of consumers, especially for products that have been on the shelf for a long
time, as exemplified by “all the reviews are good ones not even a medium rating”
(F10) and “many reviews and all of them are positive” (F8). Second, consumers also
scout the actual content or writing for telling signs of manipulations, including
“extreme words” (F9, M3), “excessively harsh reviews” (F6), unnatural descriptions
such as “similar or repeated phases, content and tone” (F6, F7, F8 and M3). Third,
mismatches between information disclosed by reviews and consumers’ own
evaluation also alert consumers the occurrence of manipulations, such as “many good
reviews despite a poor reputation” (F9), “the seller’s rating rises rapidly within a
short period” (F1) and “some reviews different from your expectations or from other
reviews” (M4). Last but not least, a surprising finding is that consumers are
suspicious about and detect the fake reviews by identifying the unusual user IDs
made of “random combinations of letters and numbers” (F4).
According to those example citations, it is obvious that consumers have the
knowledge about hints or abnormalities related to review manipulations, as well as
the vigilance and capability to avoid being misled by the manipulated reviews. The
results are consistent with previous research in both traditional unethical marketing
behaviors (e.g. Burke, et al. 1988; Darke and Ritchie 2007) and online marketing
deceptions (e.g. Hu, et al. 2011; Riquelme and Román, 2014).
(Insert Table 2 here)
3.3.3

Evaluation of Different Tactics

At the last section of the interview, we asked participants to evaluate different
manipulation strategies in terms of their perceived deceptiveness, ease of detection,
perceived ethicality and the negative impact on their purchasing behaviors. To ensure
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a consistent understanding of different manipulation tactics among 16 interviewees,
we provided a short description of each type of review manipulations before asking
the questions. The three manipulation tactics are presented to respondents in rotation
to avoid the order bias. Table 3 presents the summary.
(Insert Table 3 here)
As shown in Table 3, one finding that has emerged from the interviews is that
consumers express more negative attitude toward deleting manipulation, compared
with those toward the other two tactics. Among the three manipulation tactics,
hiding/deleting unfavorable messages was the most frequently rated as the most
deceptive (as mentioned by 11 interviewees) and the most unethical manipulation
tactic (as mentioned by 10 interviewees). And the negative impact of deleting
manipulation on the purchase intention is most severe, followed by adding and then
incentive manipulation. Deleting seems to be the most covert manipulation tactic and
the most unethical as perceived by the interviewees. This is illustrated by the
following quotes:
Deleting is the most unacceptable strategy because it influences my evaluation towards
the products. This sort of behavior is like committing a crime and then erasing any evidence.
To ignore and hide customer complaints is a serious misbehavior of online sellers, which will
make me really angry. (F1)

Deleting unfavorable comments is the most unacceptable behavior because to deceive
others is like deceiving yourself. Consumers need to be able to see both positives and
negatives of the product to make a purchasing decision. (F2)

I would much rather see the negative side of a product than to be deceived. This is
because awareness of past unsatisfactory experiences with the product from other consumers
is crucial to making an accurate judgment. (F4)

Deleting is a sort of information asymmetry. It will affect my confidence in the product
quality. Being deceived will lead to uncertainty, as we don’t receive any negative signal from
the reviews. (M1)

Meanwhile, some interviews consider incentive and adding tactics acceptable
because those practices are more overt and similar to company propaganda and
advertisement, as exemplified by the quotes listed below. Comparatively, adding and
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incentive tactics are considered as much easier to be detected by consumers because
the cues or hints cannot be fully hidden.
I can understand the seller seeking to showcase positive reviews, as long as exaggeration
is kept at a reasonable level, otherwise reviews appear incredible. (M3)

Incentives are relatively acceptable, similar to promotions. After all, they made real
purchases, thus have some credibility. (M4)

Every seller uses incentive strategy to encourage positive comments. If everyone commits
the same crime and only one person abides by the rules, that one person is losing out. (F2)

I have heard that the gifts will be given to those who have written comments, but not
necessarily good comments. It is not as deceptive as simply adding good comments, but
almost the same. (F3)

Incentives are OK. At least they are customers who had made real purchases. If the
product is really bad, I don’t think they would change their reviews just for a small incentive.
(F6)

This is a common occurrence in industry to add positive reviews to their own products.
Most consumers focus their attention on negative reviews as opposed to positive ones.
Therefore, the practice of adding positive reviews has an overall lower influence. (F11)

3.4 Discussion
There exist several conceptual frameworks of interpersonal deceptions (e.g.
information manipulation theory; Buller and Burgoon’s concealment–equivocation–
falsification classification). These previous frameworks could be extended to online
environments such as online product review manipulation. Here we discuss the
results combining existed theoretical implications.
3.4.1

Difference of Three Manipulation Tactics

From the above discussions, we derive several conjectures. First, consumers are
aware of the manipulations to different degrees, and such practices dampen their
confidence in the reviews and the products. Second, different types of manipulations
vary in terms of ease of detection, perceived unethicality, as well as their effect on
consumer perceptions. Third, consumers have knowledge and apply them when they
read online reviews. Certain hints often activate their persuasion knowledge and raise
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their suspicion. Fourth, some websites or review systems make the reviews easier to
be manipulated (“If it is on the seller’s own website, they will manipulate the buyers’
view by deleting any negative reviews behind the scene” - F10) than other
brand-neutral websites (“The probability of this situation occurring is very low” M2). Fifth, the effect of manipulations may vary depending on the status of the
brands, i.e., whether it is a popular brand or a lesser known one (“Repeatedly post
good reviews when the product does not appear very popular yet” – F2).
The above findings suggest that while consumers are aware of the review
manipulations and attitudes toward each tactic are diversified, at least, in terms of
perceived deceptiveness and unethicality. From the opinions of all the 16
interviewees, the majority considered deleting negative review as the most
unacceptable one, as it secretly violate consumers’ rights to know and conceal the
crucial negative reviews. They also believe that adding fake positive reviews would
not influence their product evaluation as strong as deleting does, since the positive
reviews are less valuable in decision making and the sufficient cues may help
consumers to eliminate the fake noises. Furthermore, the results also show that
offering incentives to positive reviewers is less likely to induce the negative emotions.
Comparing with their attitudes toward adding and deleting, consumers tend to
tolerate incentive manipulation. Some individuals consider this as the compensation
for dis-satisfied buyers, which is beneficial in improving the quality of services and
buy-seller communications. Since the reviews for incentives are posted by real
consumers, the essence of the information in the reviews does not change, even
though their objectivity may be questionable. For instance, unsatisfied consumers
may be unwilling to leave good comments for small rewards. Therefore, offering
incentives are described as tolerable and understandable by some of our subjects.
3.4.2

Consequence of Review Manipulations

Media Naturalness Theory (Kock, 2004) has been used to understand human
behavior toward technology in various contexts such as education, knowledge
transfer and communication in virtual environments. Since online product reviews
are communicated in a less natural medium, the senders would put more effort in
crafting the messages to compensate the loss in other cues, thus making online
manipulations more disguised (Kock et al., 2007). It is easier for people to detect a lie
through face-to-face medium. But with no time pressure, being anonymous and no
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other cues available, well-crafted text message are more effective lies, thus more
difficult to be detected. This leads to the same conclusion that manipulated reviews
are more deceptive than deceptive messages via other media.
Online manipulation is much more dangerous and potentially more unethical
because (1) it is an indirect deception done behind the scenes by manipulating the
word-of-mouth of other consumers, (2) comparing to brick-and-mortar store, online
sellers have lower entry and set up costs, which would lead to less severe
consequences for the sellers to manipulate product information, (3) consumers
normally view manipulated reviews as neutral or representative of other consumers’
views rather than information from sellers (Biswas and Biswas, 2004), and (4)
activities on such platforms are not yet regulated or governed by a set of agreed
guidelines, although some marketplace operators like Amazon or Taobao do suppress
such manipulative activities.
3.4.3

Role of persuasion knowledge

If we consider seller manipulations as persuasion attempts, consumers will
develop

beliefs

and

inferences

about

the

appropriateness

(e.g.

fairness,

manipulativeness) of specific types of persuasive tactics. According to Persuasion
Knowledge Model, consumers’ beliefs about the appropriateness of the online
reviews will influence their product attitude and buying decisions (Friestad and
Wright, 1994). Consumers with substantial online shopping experience have
better-developed persuasion knowledge and then the defensive suspicion is more
likely to be activated, which can protect them from being fooled by manipulations
(Darke et al., 2007). According to Ahluwalia and Burnkrant (2004), when PK is
activated, consumers become suspicious of marketers’ ulterior motives. High PK
consumers will demonstrate more positive (negative) attitudes toward the more
favorably (unfavorably) evaluated brand when its advertisement contains
promotional tactics while low PK consumers demonstrate no significant differences
in their attitude toward the brand regardless of whether its advertisement contains
promotional tactics or not. Grayson and Rank (2010) found that high PK consumers
might be more sensitized and comfortable with the “rules of the game” of persuasion
and therefore judge persuasion tactics as being more appropriate. Deception
Detection Theory suggests that individuals follow two sequential processes to detect
deception, namely the noticing of anomaly and the attribution of anomaly (Johnson et
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al., 1993, 2001; Robinson, 1996; Robinson and Morrison, 2000). Following this logic,
experienced consumers are able to notice the inconsistencies or deception cues in the
product reviews. Thus, consumers with high PK would have a better chance to detect
certain manipulation tactics and perceive the manipulations reviews as more
deceptive.
3.4.4

Factors Influencing Review Manipulation

Previous literature finds that manipulation is more valuable for a firm whose
product is less appealing to the target segment (Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas, 2006) and
for products with lower average rating (Hu et al., 2011a). A possible explanation is
that the firm with less popular products is found to spend more resources on
advertising, compared with firms of popular products, as the latter believes
consumers might receive information from other sources praising its superior product
(Moorthy and Hawkins, 2003). We posit that companies want to manipulate and
expect to gain from such practices because there are (1) not enough reviews for less
popular products; (2) too many negative reviews for low quality products.
Interviewees are suspicious of manipulated reviews when observing the fact that “the
product does not appear very popular yet, but the reviews are all positive” (F2) and
“there are many good reviews despite a poor reputation” (F9).
As warranting value (i.e., the extent to which the cue is perceived to be unaltered
by the target) can be used by an observer to gauge the accuracy of online product
reviews, warranting theory (Walther and Parks, 2002) may be useful to explain
consumer reactions to online product reviews in different shopping platforms.
Walther and Parks (2002) propose that there are two types of warranting information
namely low warrant and high warrant. Low warrant information is easily manipulated
and therefore less believable while high warrant information is more likely to be
accepted as true. Several studies (Gibbs et al., 2011; Parks, 2011; Walther et al. 2009)
confirm that the greater the potential for information misrepresentation, the more
likely observers are to be skeptical. We argue that consumers trust the reviews from
the brand-neutral websites (third-party sellers with many brands) more than those
from the websites of brand owners due to the low warranting value of information in
the latter, as manipulations can be done behind the scene if it is on the seller’s own
website but in the third-party websites the probability of manipulation is very low.
The lack of trust may lead consumers to place greater weight on negative reviews
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and/or seek reviews from neutral forums, thus resulting in a vicious cycle for the
manipulators.
To sum up, in this chapter, we qualitatively investigated the attitudes and
knowledge of experienced online consumers toward review manipulations. Based on
the background knowledge, quantitative studies would be presented in the next few
chapters to further examine the issues such as influence of review manipulations and
differences among tactics.
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this chapter, we continue our research by drawing on the qualitative findings
from last chapter and existed theoretical frameworks to develop testable hypotheses.
The hypothesized research framework of the thesis is shown in Figure 2. First, we
propose that the three popular manipulation strategies are different in terms of
perceived deceptiveness and suspicion of manipulation. Moreover, we expect that
either review manipulations or suspicion of manipulation would negative influence
consumers’ purchase intentions, which would be moderated by consumers’
persuasion knowledge. The last but not the least is that the correlations between
review manipulation and sales would fade away over sufficient long period of time.
(Insert Figure 2 here)
In the following section, we draw from the Information Manipulation Theory and
the Persuasion Knowledge Model to elaborate the relationships among variables and
the hypotheses.
4.1 Perceived Deceptiveness and Ethicality
In this section, we draw on Information Manipulation Theory to develop
hypotheses about the emotions invoked by review manipulations such as perceived
deceptiveness and ethicality.
Information Manipulation Theory (IMT) offers a multidimensional approach to
understand why message is considered as deceptive. It is designed by integrating
Grice’s (1989) theory of conversational implicature with research on deception as
information control (e.g., Bavelas et al., 1990; Metts, 1989). IMT mainly concerns
the content of the deceptive messages, the situational contexts that bring them about,
the degree to which the detection of such a message affects perceived deceptiveness
and the relational consequences associated with deceptive messages (McCornack,
1992). Deceptions are viewed as arising from covert violations of one or more of
Grice’s four maxims: (1) Quantity: Information given will be full (as pre-expected by
the viewer) and quantity violation can result in lies of omission; (2) Quality:
Information given will be truthful and correct and covert violations of quality involve
the falsification of information; (3) Relation: Information will be relevant to the
subject matter of the conversation in hand and (4) Manner: Things will be presented
in a way that enables others to understand and not confusing other people (e.g.,
McCornack et al., 1992; Yeung et al., 1999; Zhou and Lutterbie, 2005).
23

Online seller manipulations can be viewed as deliberately breaking one or few of
the four conversation maxims. We relate the maxim violations to different
manipulation strategies as follows: anonymously adding positive messages and
deleting/hiding unfavorable messages are mixed of quality and quantity violations.
They either omit (deleting) or add (adding) the amount of consumer reviews, and
directly change the quality of the information disclosed to consumers (e.g. average
ratings). Offering incentives to consumers who post favorable messages results in
quality violation, since they indirectly change the individual ratings of reviews but
may not increase or decrease the volume. Even though prior research finds that
violations of each maxim are rated more deceptive than baseline messages without
any violations, different maxim violations are also considered differentially. In other
words, not all deceptive messages are rated as equally deceptive. Violations of quality
and relevance are typically seen as more deceptive than violations of quantity and
manner (e.g., Jacobs et al., 1996; Levine, 1998, 2001; McCornack et al., 1992; Yeung
et al., 1999). Hence, adding fake reviews and deleting negative reviews should be
rated as more deceptive and evoke higher level of negative emotions.
Although IMT predicts that adding and deleting should be similar negatively
rated, our qualitative finding suggests that there is distinction between the two. For
adding manipulation which involves the manipulation of positive information,
manipulators present totally inauthentic information as it were true. While negative
review eliminators intentionally disguise the passive WOM and disclose only good
ones, which only involves the manipulation of negative information. We believe that
the symmetrically weights of positive and negative information could better explain
the distinction. As mentioned by our interviewees, reviews are evaluated with bias--negative reviews are thought as more important and authentic than the positive ones.
The bias may be caused by several reasons: firstly, in real monetary transactions,
individuals tend to be more conservative. Making the wrong decisions would directly
lead to monetary loss, so consumers are more likely to focus on risk avoidance, the
information of which would be disclosed by negative reviews. Therefore, it is
reasonable that they prefer to rely on negative reviews rather than positive reviews.
Secondly, commonly noticed fake positive reviews lead consumers to distrust
positive reviews. As showed in the exploratory study, when talking about fake good
reviews, interviewees could name the cues that help them to realize the fake positive
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reviews such as extreme emotions, irregular account names and meaningless praises.
While for concealing negative reviews, the detecting cues are limited (e.g.
manipulation may be more in non-famous websites). Therefore, their experiences of
fake reviews force them to gradually discount the persuasions of positive reviews.
Thirdly, the differences in cost of conducting adding and deleting strategy lead
consumers to distrust positive reviews. Adding fake reviews is considered as cheaper
than erasing negative records because in most of the well-known online shopping
websites (e.g. Amazon.com, TripAdvisor.com and Taobao.com), deleting or
modifying UGC is extremely difficult to conduct. Comparing with the deleting
strategy, adding positive reviews could be done via several cheap ways: a favor by
friends and relatives, professional good reviewers and etc. The differences in costs of
the two strategies make consumers to believe negative WOM are more reliable which
help to eliminate the influence of potential manipulation. Overall, due to the
asymmetry in the information evaluation, bias in information importance would lead
consumers to generate the stronger negative emotions when the unfavorable reviews
are concealed.
Our considerations are confirmed by previous research that consumers weigh
negative reviews heavier than positive ones when making purchase decisions (e.g.,
Schlosser, 2005; Sen and Lerman, 2007; Zhang and Craciun, 2010), as is often called
negativity bias (e.g., Birnbaum, 1972; Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Ito and Larsen,
1998). Among the three manipulation tactics, only deleting/hiding unfavorable
reviews concerns the direct manipulation of negative reviews, which are often
viewed as more sensitive or useful information. Based on the above discussion, we
hypothesize the following:
H1: Among the three manipulation strategies, hiding/deleting unfavorable
messages (violations of quantity) (H2A) will be rated as the most deceptive
followed by anonymously adding positive messages (violations of quality)
(H2B), and offering rewards to consumers who post favorable messages
(violations of both quality and manner) (H2C).
H2: Hiding/deleting unfavorable messages would be treated as the most unethical
strategy among the three manipulation strategies.
4.2 Mediating Role of Suspicion
McCornack and Levine (1990) explored the impact of the discovery of deception
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upon emotional intensity, negativity of emotional reaction, and relational stability for
individuals involved in relationships. They suggested that increases in suspicion
function to enhance reported emotional intensity for situations in which either the lie
or the act of lying was judged as significant. In terms of review manipulations, even
though consumers cannot fully distinguish honest reviews from fake ones, they have
the capability to detect such tricks and adjust their interpretations of online product
reviews accordingly (Hu et al., 2011a, 2012). When consumers learn that review
messages can be manipulated, they may disengage somewhat from the ongoing
interaction, draw inferences of some sort, get distracted from the message,
consciously dismiss the perceived quality, or discount what the reviewer says
(Dellarocas, 2006; Mayzlin, 2006). Thus suspicion of manipulations may disrupt the
comprehension and elaboration of the reviews, discount the value of WOM (Friestad
and Wright, 1994; Campbell and Kirmani, 2000) as well as to generate negative
emotions to products and retailers (Dellarocas, 2006). In other words, manipulations
make buyers to cast doubts on the evaluations of products indicated by online WOM,
which decrease the likelihood of buying the products. Therefore, the increased ratings
promoted by review manipulations would be less persuasive to buyers. Base on the
above discussion, we hypothesize the following:
H3: Online product reviews with manipulations will invoke more suspicion of
deception than those without manipulations.
H4: The amount of suspicion has a negative impact on consumers’ purchase
intention.
H5: With the same average rating, the purchase intention of product with review
manipulations should be lower than that of the product without manipulation.
H6: The relationship between review manipulation and purchase intention is
mediated by suspicion of manipulation.
4.3 Moderating Role of Persuasion Knowledge
Persuasion Knowledge Model suggests consumers have intuitive theories or
beliefs about how marketers try to influence them, and under certain conditions, they
use these knowledge to counter persuasion attempts (Friestad and Wright, 1994).
Consumers’ persuasion knowledge includes beliefs about marketers’ motives,
persuasion tactics, appropriateness and effectiveness of different persuasion tactics,
and strategies for coping with influence attempts. Based on PKM, consumers will use
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their knowledge of persuasion motives and tactics to interpret, evaluate and respond
to the influence from marketers. Prior research has investigated the PK from the
perspectives from adolescent skepticism toward TV advertising and knowledge of
advertiser tactics (Boush et al., 1994), similarities and differences in beliefs among
laypeople and researchers regarding television advertising techniques and strategies
(Friestad and Wright, 1995), responses to persuasion in interpersonal sales settings
(Campbell and Kirmani, 2000; Guo and Main, 2012), and the effect of regulatory
focus on the use of persuasion knowledge (Kirmani and Zhu, 2007). These studies
offered insights to the types of persuasion knowledge individuals hold, as well as
when and how it is likely to be evoked. We argue that consumers with great
experience in reading online product reviews have well-developed persuasion
knowledge than novices. They have stronger capability to deliberately process the
online product reviews and activate defensive suspicion. If persuasion knowledge is
activated, consumers become suspicious of marketers’ ulterior motives and behave
more negatively, which can protect them from being cheated by unauthentic
information (Darke et al., 2007).
If considering seller manipulations as persuasion attempts, consumers will
develop beliefs and inference about the appropriateness (e.g. fairness and
manipulativeness) of specific types of persuasive tactics. Review manipulations
evoke consumers’ persuasion knowledge since the problematic reviews contain
abnormalities that deviate from their anticipations. For instance, consumers may
detect adding strategy by the extreme positive rating and content that goes far beyond
their evaluation, deleting strategy by the strange rating distribution or time of posting,
and incentive strategy by the disclosed rebates or giveaways. These cues become
stimulants for persuasion knowledge, if only shoppers have sufficient knowledge
about marketers’ motives and persuasive tactics. Once activated, persuasion
knowledge would lead the consumers to appropriately perceive the persuasive
attempts and evaluate the information. In other words, subjects who are more likely
to use their persuasion knowledge have stronger perception of manipulations
(Ahluwalia and Burnkrant, 2004). Thus we hypothesize the following:
H7: Persuasion knowledge would enhance the suspicion evoked by manipulated
reviews.
However, persuasion knowledge may also help consumers to cope with the
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persuasive attempts and maximize their benefits (Friestad and Wright, 1994).
Previous research suggests that consumers with higher persuasion knowledge
generate favorable evaluations when facing promotional tactics of the brands they
like (Ahluwalia and Burnkrant, 2004) and consider persuasive attempts as “rule of
the game” and tolerable (Grayson and Rank, 2010). In other words, PK does
influence perceptions of persuasion acceptability, but the direction of link between
persuasion knowledge and acceptability depends on how “acceptable” is defined.
Inoculation Theory (McGuire, 1961; Crowley and Hoyer, 1994) provides an
alternative explanation for the above contextual effect of PK. Consumers who were
pre-exposed to attacks (review manipulation in our context) would view the
subsequent strong attacks less believable and generate more supportively cognitive
responses. We argue that the counterintuitive effect of Persuasion Knowledge may be
caused by different mechanism of its function in two stages--- information evaluation
and purchase decision. In the information evaluation stage when consumers evaluate
the review information, learn the manipulative intent and make evaluations,
consumers with greater persuasion knowledge would have higher level of suspicion
of the authenticity of reviews and are more likely notice the cues of manipulation.
Therefore, persuasion knowledge enables consumers to pay more attention to the
suspicious abnormalities when evaluating the reviews. While, in the purchase
decision stage when consumers evaluate the transaction and make decisions,
persuasion knowledge would influences consumers’ expectations about the
authenticity of online reviews. High PK individuals are more likely to have
experienced review manipulations. They are more familiar with the manipulative
practices and expect certain extent of review manipulation. With these expectations,
the consumers may adjust their reliance on the reviews. Moreover, high PK
consumers perceive the manipulative intent as more tolerable and may not consider
such practices as serious. Therefore, the purchase intentions of high PK consumers
should be less influenced by suspicion than that of low PK consumers. The
Inoculation Theory suggests that consumers who were pre-exposed to arguments
would view the subsequent attempts less believable and are less likely to be
influenced by them (McGuire 1961; Crowley and Hoyer 1994). Following the logic,
we argue that high PK consumers have more online shopping experiences and know
better how to cope with review manipulations. Given their prior exposure to
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manipulations, high PK consumers are more likely to filter out the abnormal reviews,
accept review manipulations as “hidden rules” and tolerate them to some extent, even
though they enjoy a higher possibility to detect manipulations. Thus we hypothesize
the following:
H8: The negative impact of manipulation suspicion on purchase intention toward
the focal product is more pronounced among low PK consumers than high
PK consumers.
4.4 Effect of Review Manipulations
Review manipulations are commonly adopted as powerful marketing strategies
by e-retailers. Online WOM is suggested as valid reference that the majority of
consumers turn to before making purchase decisions (e.g. Godes and Mayzlin, 2004).
The rating of WOM is also considered as one of the most influential factors (e.g.
Chen et al., 2011). As suggested by the definitions of review manipulations, the key
benefit they bring about is the increased WOM rating (Dellarocas, 2006; Mayzlin et
al., 2013). To be specific, posting fake positive reviews increases average ratings by
introducing better-than-average reviews into the pool, deleting/hiding negative
reviews strategy deletes/hides the worse-than-average reviews and offering incentive
to positive review posters that induce consumers to more positively rate the product.
These three either increase the overall average rating (e.g. average rating of all
reviews)

or seeable

rating (e.g.

first-page

rating).

In

comparison

with

non-manipulated products, items with intentional manipulation should enjoy a
comparatively higher (seeable) rating. The increased rating may boost the probability
that the focal products were highly evaluated by the potential buyers, which would
finalize in higher purchase intention. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H9: Review manipulation would positively influence the sales of focal products.
Review manipulation may significantly promote sales of focal products,
nevertheless, once consumers affirm that reviews are deceptive, they would adjust
their attitudes and turn to other references of information (e.g. Friestad and Wright,
1994; Campbell and Kirmani, 2000; Hu et al., 2011a, 2012). On the hand,
manipulators would elaborately design manipulation strategies and disguise the
“warning” cues into something undetectable in case of being suspected, which
reduces the probabilities of being suspected. In other words, although review
manipulations are design as authentic and difficult to be noticed, but once detected,
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review manipulations would adversely decrease purchase likelihood.
We think that review manipulation should be functional for the early-stage buyers,
due to the fact that it is less likely for them to find out the tricks played by sellers. For
repeated buyers, they have higher chance to suspect that the reviews are not as intact
as they should be. This might be caused by the previous shopping experiences--- the
mismatch between what they buy and what the reviews described. Repeated
purchases provide comparatively sufficient opportunities for consumers to update
their knowledge (Zhao et al., 2013). Following the logic, information learning and
updating would lead consumers to cope with fraudulent reviews and also lead review
manipulation to gradually loss its power in influencing product evaluations. Hence,
we propose:
H10: The impact size of manipulation intensity on sales would decrease over time.
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Chapter 5 Study One: Attitudes Towards Manipulation Strategies
One of the main goals of our research is to differentiate the 3 popular
manipulation categories. Previous studies focused either on a single manipulation
strategy or on the general consequences of using “manipulation”, no one has ever
concentrated on their distinctive characters and impacts. In this chapter, a
within-subject survey was conducted to test hypothesis 1 and 2. This survey was
designed to empirically examine consumers’ attitudes of the three manipulation
strategies.
5.1 Participants and Procedures
Our subjects were randomly recruited from Mainland, China. Qualified subjects
should have experiences in online shopping and basic knowledge of manipulation
strategies. The subjects were first told the definitions of the three commonly noticed
manipulation strategies: (1) Anonymously adding fake (positive) reviews: Firms,
retailers, their employees or associates pose as consumers and anonymously post
“fake” positive reviews to their own products even though she/he may not really have
bought or used the product. (2) Hiding/deleting negative reviews: Firms or retailers
would intentionally delete, remove or hide negative unfavorable reviews of their
products from the readers. (3) Incentives for positive reviews: Firms or retailers give
incentives (a discount, a gift or other reward) to their consumers to encourage them to
write positive reviews to their products. Then they are asked to imagine that they
were encountering one of the 3 strategies sequentially (in a random order) and then
their attitudes were measured by our questionnaire. Here we measured perceived
deceptiveness (Maddox, 1982) and unethicality (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990)
toward the situations involving each of the three manipulation strategies. The
multi-item scales and the measured reliability are shown in Table 4.
(Insert Table 4 here)
5.2 Results
We collected 199 valid questionnaires. Average age of our subjects is 21.47 (min
18, max 34), and most are female (79.4%). We first use ANOVA to test the
differences among the three groups. Significant differences in perceived
deceptiveness (F(2, 183)=192.48, p<0.001) and ethicality (F(2,154)=126.40, p<0.001)
are found among the three groups but not between genders (Perceived deceptiveness:
F(1,595)=0.79, p>0.1; ethicality: F(1,595)=0.80, p>0.1). Pairwise t-test could help us
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further examine the detailed relationships. Table 5 shows the mean scores of
measured variables in the three manipulation strategies. Hypothesis 1 suggests that
deleting should be considered as the most deceptive strategy and followed by adding
and incentive strategy. As we may notice, the relations shown in first row of Table 5
confirm our H1: deleting is rated as the significantly more deceptive (mean=6.28)
than the other two strategies, whereas adding (mean=6.11) and incentives
(mean=4.54) are less deceptively considered. Hypothesis 2 assumes that deleting
strategy would be regard as the most unethical manipulation type. The results also
support our H2 that deleting (mean=6.22) is thought as more unethical than adding
(mean=6.09) and incentives (mean=4.64). We also measured the ease of detection
among the three tactics. The subjects commonly rated deleting strategy as the hardest
one to be detected (mean=5.52), followed by adding manipulation (mean=5.22) and
incentives (mean=4.35). These results are consistent with the findings in the prior
study and our hypothesis 1 and 2 are strongly supported.
(Insert Table 5 here)
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter we empirically examine the manipulations differentiation
concluded in the exploratory study. We find that consumers generally considered the
three popular tactics differently in terms of perceived deceptiveness and ethicality:
consumers commonly rate deleting strategy as the most unethical and deceptive
manipulation strategy than the other two. Our H1 and H2 are all well supported. As
we expected, consumers commonly hold the negativity bias comparing to the
positivity bias (i.e. rely more on negative information rather than positive ones).
Review manipulations disturbing the disclosure of valued information would be
treated as more deceptive. In addition, through mean comparison, we also note that
the perceived deceptiveness and unethicality for incentive manipulation are much
lower than those of adding and deleting manipulation. This confirms our finding in
the exploratory study that incentive manipulation is relatively tolerable than the other
two tactics.
However, one of the key questions remains unanswered: if the review
manipulations are disliked by consumers, would they negative influence the purchase
decisions? From the analysis of study 1, we realize that the three tactics vary in terms
of detectability. Therefore, whether consumers are able to detect such strategies and
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react to them remains an interesting empirical problem. In the next study, the
negative influence of manipulations would be examined under a more realistic
circumstance, in which consumers need to face the deceptive tactics and make their
own judgments.
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Chapter 6 Study Two: Simulated Field Experiment of Consumer Response
Previous study suggested that manipulations are rated as deceptive and unethical,
which may severely influence the credits of retailers. However, why online review
manipulations are still popular among distributors? Would consumers react to
manipulated product reviews in the way as what they should be? To answer the
questions, consumers’ responses will be investigated when they encounter a more
sophisticated environment. In this study, rather than evaluating descriptions and
definitions, consumers may read manipulated reviews without warnings and
notifications. Hence, it would be an interesting question for us: how would their
knowledge, detecting capability and coping strategy shape their performances in
decision making? A simulated field-experiment is conducted to examine our
hypotheses 3 to 8 in a more realistic context. The goal of the experiment is to
examine the negative consequences of review manipulations, i.e., how severe are the
potentially actual negative consequences stemming from the inauthentic reviews and
how persuasion knowledge can influence this negative impact.
6.1 Participants and Procedure
More than two hundred students in a major Hong Kong university participated in
the experiment. Subjects were volunteers recruited among the undergraduate students
in the Faculty of Business. As an incentive for their participation, each of them
received two highlighters at the end of the experiment. Participants should have
online shopping experience in the past one year and have been used to viewing online
product reviews when making purchase decisions. Qualified subjects are randomly
assigned to one of the four scenarios, each of which simulates a realistic online
product homepage for a pair of outdoor shoes with the most recent six consumer
reviews. The brand and the online store are designed to be unrecognizable that
subjects cannot relate the product and platform with their previous experiences.
Scenarios are designed as follows. Anonymously adding fake (positive) reviews:
some positive reviews (5 out of 5 stars) with extremely positive comments are
intended to be added after the negative ones using a same user account.
Hiding/deleting negative reviews: the negative reviews were deleted/hidden so that
subjects could only read the positive ones. Incentives for positive reviews: incentive
information is presented in a highlighted form so that consumers know that positive
reviewers received an immediate discount, which is confirmed by posters in their
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reviews. Control group: The reviews are left intact and objectively reflect the
attitudes or opinions of the reviewers. An example of the scenario design is shown in
the Appendix B.
The respondents were informed that the study is to test their ability to understand,
analyze and evaluate the online product reviews. They should read the product
homepage and reviews very carefully before answering the questions. They may go
back to the product homepage and reviews at any time and read them again, if
necessary, when they have trouble answering any of the related questions.
Respondents were then asked to choose the assigned scenario and report their
perceived ethicality, suspicion of reviews and their purchase intention toward the
product. At the end of the experiment, they complete some other measurement of
individual traits (i.e., persuasion knowledge, online expertise) and demographic items.
The experiment ended with a usable sample of 254 respondents.
6.2 Measurement
Variables are measured by scales which have been successfully used in several
previous studies showing good reliability and validity. Purchase intention is measured
on a scale bipolar labeled with 1 (very unlikely to buy) and 7 (very likely to buy).
Suspicion of deception (alpha=0.910, Kirmani and Zhu, 2007), persuasion knowledge
(alpha=0.782, Bearden et al., 2001) and review involvement (alpha=0.770, Novak
and Hoffman, 2000) are measured by multiple item scales. All scales are scored in
such a way that high values indicate a greater degree of the traits.
The manipulation scenarios are represented by a categorical dummy variable.
Three dummy variables represent the scenario subjects received: subjects in each
group with manipulation (adding, deleting and incentive) would be coded as 1 in the
corresponding dummy, while control group would be coded as 0 (representing
“without manipulation”) in all the three dummy variables.
6.3 Results
6.3.1

Main Effect

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of variables (except for
perceived ethicality) are shown in Table 6. Review involvement strongly affects
consumers’ attention and usage of the reviews (Novak and Hoffman, 2000). Gender
may also affect purchase intention since previous research suggests that female
adopted a stricter ethical stance than males when assessing unethical practices
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(Weeks and Moore, 1999). Hence we control these two variables in our regression
analysis.
(Insert Table 6)
We hypothesize that persuasion knowledge moderates the impacts of both
manipulation on suspicion and of suspicion on purchase intentions. Given that
consumer responses were measured on 7-point scales with larger values indicating
higher purchase intention, negative regression estimates indicate the hypothesized
negative consequences of manipulation on suspicion and suspicion on purchase
intention. The OLS results are shown in Table 7.
(Insert Table 7 here)
We first focus on the suspicion invoked by review manipulations. Hypothesis 3
suggests that online reviews with any categories of review manipulations would lead
consumers to suspect the authenticity of online reviews. As shown in 1st column of
Table 7, after controlling for gender and review involvement, the estimated
coefficients of manipulation dummies are all significantly larger than 0, showing a
strong positive influence of review manipulations on suspicion. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported.
The second stage results are shown in the 2nd column of Table 7. As we expected,
the standardized estimate supports our H4 that it confirms a strong negative
relationship between suspicion and consumers’ purchase intention (β=-0.68, p<0.001).
The moderating effects of persuasion knowledge and mediating effect of deception
suspicion are tested by path analysis suggested by Edwards and Lamber (2007, see
Model D) that the effects should be calculated by the multiple of coefficients and
selected values of moderator (here we selected the +/- 1 standard deviation of the
mean centered persuasion knowledge), the analysis results are shown in Table 8.
(Insert Table 8 here)
Hypothesis 5 suggests that, after controlling for the average ratings, review
manipulations would negatively influence the purchase intention toward the focal
products. The estimated total effects (5th column of Table 8) only marginally support
H5 when high PK consumers encountering strategy of adding (β=-0.35, p<0.1), and
no supporting evidences are found in other situations. Therefore, we cannot safely
conclude that H5 is supported.
6.3.2

Mediation of Suspicion
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The mediation of suspicion is tested by the estimated indirect effect (4th column
of Table 8). The coefficients of indirect effects support hypothesis 6: for the high PK
group, suspicion mediates the relationship between review manipulations and
purchase intentions for subjects in adding, deleting and incentives groups. While for
people with lower PK, the indirect effects are ignorable that the influence of review
manipulations on purchase intentions only contains the direct influence. Figure 3
shows the relationship.
(Insert Figure 3 here)
6.3.3

Moderation of Persuasion Knowledge

We continue our analysis on the first stage moderation of persuasion knowledge.
The hypothesis 7 claims that persuasion knowledge would enhance the suspicion
invoked by review manipulations. The estimated results are shown in the 1st column
of Table 8.
For the group of subjects receiving adding scenario (upper part), the estimated
first stage difference (Diff=1.09, p<0.01) that consumers with higher persuasion
knowledge would generate more suspicion than the consumers with lower persuasion
knowledge. The difference of the total effects (Diff=-0.61, p<0.01) shows that,
overall, consumers with higher persuasion knowledge should be depressed to buy the
product when reading reviews with adding strategy while consumers with lower
persuasion knowledge are not influenced by the added reviews.
The middle part of Table 8 shows the results for deleting group. Its results
indicate that the first stage moderation of persuasion knowledge on the relationship
between deleting strategy and suspicion is only marginally supported (Diff=0.56,
p<0.1). The overall effects of deleting strategy on purchase intention are not found to
both higher and lower persuasion knowledge consumers, showing that subjects
reading reviews with deleting strategy is not significantly influenced in terms of their
willingness to buy.
The results of incentive group, which is the lower part, suggest that the first stage
moderation of persuasion knowledge (Diff=0.31, p>0.1) is not existed to the subjects
facing reviews with incentive manipulations. Similar to subjects in deleting group,
subjects in incentive group are not significantly influenced by the manipulations on
their purchase intention. This result is consistent with our prediction that persuasion
knowledge would enhance the negative relationship between manipulations and
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suspicion, thus hypothesis 7 is partially supported.
Hypothesis 8 verified the second stage moderating effect of persuasion
knowledge. It predicts that persuasion knowledge would weaken the negative
influence of suspicion of deception on purchase intention. The estimated results are
shown in the 2nd column of Table 8. The difference (Diff=0.17, p<0.05) support our
prediction that the negative impact of suspicion on purchase intention is weaker
among high PK subjects. Therefore our hypothesis 7 is also strongly supported. To
better illustrate our results, the path analysis is shown in Figure 4 and the simple
slopes of the two stage moderating effects are shown in Figure 5.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
(Insert Figure 5 here)
6.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we investigate the influences of review manipulations on
consumers’ purchasing behaviors and the impacts of persuasion knowledge. By
conducting the simulated field-experiment, we find that subjects receiving reviews
with 3 categories of manipulated reviews generate more suspicions than those
receiving intact one, but their purchase intentions are not significantly influenced.
Interesting results are also found with respect to the moderating role of persuasion
knowledge. Supporting evidence is found for the hypothesis that persuasion
knowledge would enhance consumers’ suspicion for the subjects receiving reviews
with adding and deleting. We also find the supporting evidence for our hypothesis
that persuasion knowledge would drive consumers to tolerate certain extent of review
manipulations and weaken the negative influence on their purchase decisions. These
two stage moderating effects could more clearly explain how consumers detect and
cope with review manipulations they encountered. If the two moderating effects are
considered concurrently, the purchase intentions are more likely not to be influence
by reviews with manipulation. Mediation of suspicion is also supported that it
mediates the relationship between manipulations and purchase intention if the
subjects have higher level of persuasion knowledge.
The results help us to understand how consumers react to the manipulated
reviews when they read reviews of an unknown brand in an unfamiliar website.
However, under the setting of our experiment, we were unable to investigate the
positive influence of review manipulations, which is usually induced by the increased
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ratings. In our experiment, the average ratings are held constant across the 4 groups,
therefore the positive influence of review manipulations is not considered in this
study. In the next study we would further address the questions by examining the
effect of review manipulations on sales.
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Chapter 7 Study Three: The Effect of Review Manipulations on Sales
In previous chapter, we use simulated field experiment to examine the consumers’
responding mechanisms to review manipulations. However, due to the limitations of
experiments, the benefits of review manipulations cannot be tested. To invest the
empirical performance of review manipulations and realistic validity, we use the
historical data to test the influence of manipulations on consumers’ attitudes and
sales.
7.1 Data Description
The product category in the study is fashion clothes, as it is suggested that
user-generated reviews are particularly important to the experience products (King
and Balasubramanian, 1994). We acquired the data from one of the biggest online
apparel retailers in China. The data covers 555 product promotional campaigns on a
well-known third-party social network website, which includes the 31-days
cumulative unit sales of the promoted products, the WOM information in the social
network and in their own websites from year 2011 to 2013. The average sales over
the 31 days are shown in Figure 6, which suggests that the majority of sales
concentrated within the first week of promotion. Since it is suggested that the life
cycle of fashion product is comparatively shorter than other types of products, we
assume the cumulative sales of 31 days could represent the overall sales of these
products.
(Insert Figure 6 here)
Our data comes from two sources: the retailer’s own online store and its public
page on a well-known social network. On the retailer’s web store, the review system
is similar to that of Amazon.com, through which consumers can browse, buy the
products on the shelf, and leave reviews only after each purchase. The buyers should
rate the product according to their satisfaction from 1 star to 5 stars, and write a
comment about the product if they want. On the social network website, whose
review system is similar to facebook.com, the retailers post blogs to promote or
recommend their products to the “fans” of its public page. After reading the
advertisements, consumers may choose to “like”, “share” or do nothing. Therefore,
the “like” system could be considered as a bipolar rating system where “like”
represents positive WOM, while the absence of a “like” could be interpreted as lack
of interesting, neutral or negative perception.
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We believe that the extent of review manipulations differs across the two
platforms due to a couple of reasons. Firstly, the cost of manipulations is different. It
is believed that the costs of manipulations on the corporate websites are lower than
those on the third-party platforms. The retailer, who’s also the manager of the web
store, can access the database of product reviews and modify the review data.
Regulations regarding manipulation of reviews on their own web stores are not as
strict as on the well-known third-party retailing platforms. The retailers are able to
manipulate reviews at a minimum cost on its own store. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the cost of review manipulation is lower on the company website than on
the third-party website, and review manipulations are more common on retailer’s
own web store than the third-party forum.
Secondly, the motivation of manipulating WOM may vary across the two
platforms. The amount of “like” is lower in the reference value for the future buyers,
thus retailers may not prefer to manipulate it. On public forums, marketers generally
release product promotions and advertisements (usually once or several times a day)
to attract consumers to view the product on their own web stores, which suggests that
the WOM in public forums reflects consumers’ pre-purchase attitudes. In contrast,
product evaluations are more likely to occur on the web stores rather than on the
promotional pages, since the pre-purchase attitudes are considered as comparatively
lower in reference value for future buyers. Thus, retailers would have greater
motivation to manipulate the reviews on their own websites rather than the “likes” on
the third-party forums. Furthermore, a “like” in social network is relatively less
valuable in WOM transmission, thus a retailer is less motivated to manipulate it. To
promote their products, retailers hope its reader to spread their promotions and
advertisements to reach as many consumers as possible. Given to the regulations of
the social network website, these ads could only be directly distributed to the “fans”
of the retailer’s public page, and their fans may reposted by “share” to reach other
non-fan users. However, fans “share” the ad may either due to their positive emotions
or negative ones. In contrast, “like” the ad will not contribute to the transmissions of
promotions, but only express the readers’ positive attitudes. We argue that the benefit
of manipulating “like” is lower than manipulating average ratings on the company
website. Hence, retailers’ motivation of manipulating the amount of “likes” should be
weaker than that of the amount of positive reviews on their company website.
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The summary statistics for WOM and other key variables are provided in Table 9.
We may notice that the average rating on the company website is higher than we
generally thought: average rating is 4.74 out of 5 and over 90% of the products
receive average rating above 4.5 out of 5. Generally, online WOM is assumed to
follow a normal distribution (Hu et al., 2011a). The distributions of the two key
measures in Figure 7 show that the ratio of likes is more close to normal distribution
than the ratio of positive reviews on the company web store. This could support our
assumption that manipulation is more popular in retailer’s web store.
(Insert Table 9 here)
(Insert Figure 7 here)
We think that the positive skewness of average ratings may be due to review
manipulations that retailers intentionally use to increase the average ratings of poorly
rated products, and therefore the rating of reviews concentrates on the positive range
(above 4 out of 5). Otherwise, the alternative explanation is that the qualities of
products appropriately compensate for the discrepancy across initial evaluations of
different products, which results in the concentration of product ratings. In other
words, the majority of products receive indifferent after-purchase evaluations,
although they were heterogeneous in quality and differently rated before transactions.
The latter explanation is less likely to be fulfilled than the one of review
manipulation. Therefore, we think that the manipulation of WOM ratings should be
attributed for this rating concentration.
7.2 Methodology and Results
As described, we collected data from the two sources, the retailer’s own web
store and the public page on a third-party social network. The key difference between
the reviews from the two sources is that WOM in public page are less likely to be
manipulated. In other words, WOM in social networks more precisely represents
consumers’ evaluations toward the products. The difference between the WOM
across the two platforms could potentially help us identify the intensity of
manipulations. Previous research suggests that both volume and rating are critical
predictors of the sales of product (e.g. Chen and Xie, 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Godes
and Mayzlin 2004). However, in our study, reviews could only be posted within 6
months after the transactions occur, therefore the WOM volume in web store is
caused by sales but the other way round. To eliminate the influence of volume, we
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would control this variable in our estimation model instead studying the influence of
WOM volume.
7.2.1

The Differences Between WOM on the Two Platforms

Prior studies suggest that WOM rating is an effective indicator of sales. When
there is no manipulation at all, online reviews on the two platforms are expected to be
equally effective. However, the implementation of manipulation may decrease the
authenticity of online WOM rating and therefore reduce its predictive power. Here
we first study the effectiveness of the WOM on the two platforms to further support
our basic assumption. We try to approximate the WOM ratings on the public page as
follows: consumers could read the product advertisements and “like” it, which could
be considered as a bipolar rating system that “like” is similar to posting a positive
WOM. Otherwise, no “like” means a neutral or negative WOM. Therefore, we use
the ratio of “likes” and “reads” to approximate the WOM rating and total number of
“reads” as WOM volume.
Consider the estimating equation:
(1) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝐗𝐢𝐣 𝐁𝟏 + 𝐎𝐰𝐧𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐣 𝐁𝟐 + 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐣 𝐁𝟑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

This specification estimates the correlations between the sales and online product
WOM. Our primary interest will be the predicting power of average ratings from
both the retailers’ own websites and the third-party social networks, on the 31 days
cumulative sales. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents the unit sales for product j in promotion i, 𝐗 𝐢𝐣
contains the controls for the characteristics of campaign i and product j such as brand
status, season, theme, giveaways, coupon rebates, discount rate and time limit.
𝐎𝐰𝐧𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐣 contains the volume and average ratings of the reviews for product j on
retailers’ websites. 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐢𝐣 contains the approximated ratings of product j in
promotion i on the public page, as well as the total amount of “reads” promotion i
receives. To directly compare the effect sizes of key variables, we use the
standardized value of the key measures.
Prior literature suggests that ratings cannot significantly influence the sales of
products after considering volume (Liu, 2006), dispersion (Godes and Mayzlin, 2009)
and endogeneity (Duan et al., 2008). These findings are counter-intuitive because it is
commonly believed that consumers would refer to online reviews before making
purchase decisions. Zhu and Zhang (2010) suggested that several factors including
review manipulation may be attributed to this counter-intuitive finding. In our study,
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we assume that consumers are aware of review manipulations, thus influence of
reviews would be weakened. Even though it is commonly believed that the average
ratings indicate the quality of a product and should be positively correlated with sales
from the online store. However, if reviews are suspected to be manipulated,
consumers would adjust their reliance on product reviews. According to our
assumption that review manipulation is more likely to occur on the retailer’s own
web store rather than on the social networks, we expect the average rating on
retailer’s web store would have weaker influence than the “ratings” on the social
network. The estimation results are shown in Table 10.
(Insert Table 10 here)
From Table 10, we note three key findings from the analysis. First, we focus on
the effect of average rating and volume of the reviews on retailer’s own web store, as
shown in the column 1. As we expect, the estimated coefficients suggest that the
average review rating is not significantly correlated with cumulative sales when
product-level variables are controlled. Second, the estimated coefficient suggests a
strong and statistically significant impact from the rating of the public page on the
cumulative sales even after controlling for the amount of reads, as shown in the 2 nd
column. Third, the approximated rating in social networks (with fewer manipulations)
performs better in predicting sales than rating in its own web store (with more
manipulations) in terms of the significance level. In other words, the cumulative sales
significantly correlate with their initial preferences but not the observed reviews. All
the control variables have the expected signs. We find negative effects of price and
time limit as well as the positive impact of coupon and discount rate on the
cumulative sales. The result supports our assumption that reviews on the web store
suffers from more severe manipulations and thus has less value to the shoppers.
7.2.2

Manipulation Intensity

We have explored the effects of average ratings on web store and public page in
last section. To further investigate the direct influences of review manipulations, we
adopt a more accurate measurement of manipulation intensity. One of the goals of
review manipulations is to increase the percentage of positive reviews; hence, the
difference between the WOM ratings of same products could approximate the
increased no. of positive reviews and the relative intensity of manipulations. This
approach is similar to the one used by Mayzlin et al. (2013). The proxy of relative
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manipulation intensity is:
Manipulation Intensity𝑗 =

No. of positive reviews𝑗
No. of likes𝑗
−
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑗

Where Manipulation Intensity𝑗 represents the relative manipulation intensity
product j suffers. No. of positive reviews𝑗 indicates the amount of positive reviews
(4 and 5 stars) for product j on the retailer’s own website, while 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗
indicates the volume of reviews to product j. No. of likes𝑗 refers to the amount of
“likes” the promoted product j receives on its public page and 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑗 refers
to the number of times that the advertisement of product j was read. Here we take
difference for the two transformed ratios because the ratio of positive reviews is
tremendously larger than the ratio of likes (Mean=0.9515 vs. 0.0076). They are
transformed into the range [0, 1] in order to balance the weights of information
carried by the proxy. The details of transformation are presented in the appendix.
Now consider the estimate equation 2:
(2) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝐗 𝐢𝐣 𝐁𝟏 + 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 B3 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

Similar to equation 1, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents the unit sales for product j in promotion i.
𝐗 𝐢𝐣 contains the controls for the characteristics for campaign i and product j such as
brand status, season, theme, free extras, coupon rebates, value, discount and time
limit. OwnVolumej indicates the volume of the reviews for product j on retailers’
websites. Manipulationj means the relative manipulation intensity of promoted
product j. Our primary interest in equation 2 is to find the relationship between the
cumulative sales and the relative manipulation intensity. We hypothesize that the
increased ratio of positive reviews would increase product evaluations and
cumulative sales. The estimates of equation are shown in Table 11.
(Insert Table 11 here)
From Table 11, we notice that the estimated coefficient of manipulation intensity
on cumulative sales is positively significant (1st and 2nd column), suggesting that the
increase in the ratio of positive reviews effectively promotes sales, which supports
hypothesis 8. This shows that generally, manipulated reviews significantly boost
consumers’ purchase willingness. The signs of other control variables are consistent
with the results of equation 1.
In contrast to the simulated settings in study 2, buyers may be more sensitive to
the deceptions. However, retailers should also elaborately disguise the abnormalities
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in case their efforts do not pan out. Hence, in real settings, review manipulations turn
to be more complicated and may significantly influence consumers’ judgments. This
provides sufficient temptation for sellers to manipulate the reviews. Even the cues of
manipulation are so elaborately disguised that the first-time shoppers can hardly
detect the manipulated reviews, but prior experiences may lead consumers to adjust
their beliefs. In the next section, the key issue is to investigate time effects of
manipulations.
7.2.3

Effects of Manipulations Over Time

In this section we investigate the effect of manipulations on sales overtime, i.e.
the influence of time on the performance of manipulations. Previous research shows
that consumers actually learn from online WOM and further modify their knowledge.
In long run, online review manipulations would increase the perceived risk of buyers
(Zhao et al., 2013). In the context of review manipulations, consumers update their
knowledge by receiving the products which is not as high quality as the reviews
suggested. Following the logic, manipulations should be effective at the early stage,
but after a period, consumers would eventually discover this trick and adjust their
reliance on the suspicious reviews. We divide the promotions into 3 groups according
to the occurrence date and code them into a category variable. The interaction terms
of time dummy and manipulation intensity are introduced to equation 3 that we could
further test the influence of time. Now consider equation 3:
(3) 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝐗 𝐢𝐣 𝐁𝟏 + 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 B2 + 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 ∗ 𝐓𝐦𝐞𝐃𝐮𝐦𝐦𝐲𝐢 𝐁𝟑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗

The definitions of variables are similar to equation 2. 𝐓𝐢𝐦𝐞𝐃𝐮𝐦𝐦𝐲𝐢 represents the
time when promotion i occurs, and the interaction term indicates the impact of time
on the influence of manipulations. To contrast the three periods, we select time period
2 as reference. We expect that the coefficients of the period-1 interaction to be
positive while period-2 interaction to be negative, i.e., the impact size of increased
positive review ratio decreases over time. The estimate results are shown in Table 12.
(Insert Table 12 here)
The estimates of equation 3 partially support our hypothesis 9. The results
suggest that the impact size of manipulation intensity increases from time period 1 to
2 (β=-79.88, p<0.05), but from period 2 to period 3, the impact size dramatically
decreases (β=-107.35, p<0.01). All other coefficients of control variables are
expected as our previous results. The estimates support our prediction that review
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manipulations would eventually lose its power over time and turn out to be an
ineffective marketing strategy over the long run.
7.2.4

Robustness Checks

In this section, we would further check the robustness of our results for various
specifications. The biggest concern is the robustness of the manipulation intensity
proxy, which indicates the relative increase in the ratings for a product. Manipulation
intensity is measured by the difference between the ratios of positive reviews of two
platforms. In previous section we considered both 4- and 5-star reviews as positive
WOM, as suggested by previous research (e.g. Hu et al., 2011a; Mayzlin et al., 2013).
However, in our case the average ratings on the retailer’s own store is 4.74 out of 5,
and over 90% of products receive the average ratings above 4.50 out of 5. In this case,
the 4-star reviews may not be as positive as commonly considered since the 4-star
reviews are lower than the average. Nonetheless, we provide robustness results where
we examine the basic specification in equation 2 and 3, but consider only the
determinants of 5 star reviews. The results of the robustness checks are shown in
Table 13.
(Insert Table 13 here)
In the first column of Table 13, we consider only 5-star reviews as positive
reviews to re-estimate the equation 2, and the second column for equation 3. Notably,
the exclusion of 4-star reviews doesn’t alter our previous results; the manipulation
intensity significantly impact on the cumulative sales (β=13.63, p<0.001) and the size
of this effect decreases from the first time period to the third. This results better
support our hypothesis 9 and 10.
Secondly, we include the volume of reviews in the measurement of manipulation
intensity and re-test our hypothesis. In previous section, the difference between the
two ratios of positive reviews would reflect the increased rating brought by the
review manipulations (Mayzlin et al., 2013). However, volume of reviews may also
affect the perceptions of product quality or popularity. For instance, to increase the
average rating from 4.5 to 5 is more costly and convincing for the products with 100
reviews than for the products with only 10 reviews. To more accurately measure the
manipulation intensity, we would also include the volume of reviews into the proxy,
which is shown as:
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Manipulation Intensity𝑗 = (

No. of positive reviews𝑗
No. of likes𝑗
−
) ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑗

Here, we multiply the volume of reviews with the differences of ratios, i.e., the
increased rating multiplied by the volume of reviews. This new proxy represents the
total number of stars one product is increased, in which the influence of volume is
considered. Table 14 repeats the regression specifications of Table 13, replacing the
proxy of manipulation intensity with the new one.
(Insert Table 14 here)
In the first column of Table 14, as we read, in the influence of manipulation
intensity on sales remains unchanged, suggesting that including the volume would
not significantly alter our previous finding with respect to

hypothesis 9 (β=0.79,

p<0.001). The second column of table 14 shows that the relationship between
manipulation intensity and sales still decrease over time, indicating that the H10 still
remains valid even after the influence of volume is included. Overall, we take these
two sets of results as supportive the robustness of our findings are robust when
alternative proxies of manipulation intensity are considered.
7.3 Discussion
Our preceding analyses in this chapter focus on the influence of manipulations on
the reviews effectiveness and product sales. We first investigate the predictive power
of the ratings across different platforms--- web store and social network. Secondly,
we approximate the relative manipulation intensity and empirically examine the
influence of review manipulations on sales. Third, we also examine the correlations
of review manipulations and cumulative sales overtime. The results of our analysis
suggest that, 1) the average review ratings in the retailer’s own web store (with more
manipulations) cannot effectively reflect the sales of products, while the
approximated ratings on a third-party social network (with less manipulations)
predict sales more accurately, suggesting that manipulations would decrease the
predictive power of WOM; 2) review manipulations positively correlate with the
cumulative sales of products; and 3) although review manipulations positively
influence sales, its impact size decreases over time. The results are expected because,
as mentioned by our interviewees in pre-study, experienced consumers may expect
manipulations in the store of independent retailers rather than on third-party website.
Furthermore, we also believe, consumers, as intelligent beings, also learn and adjust
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their knowledge toward the reference value of reviews. Experiencing review
manipulation would teach consumers to rely less on the suspicious reviews to make
their decisions, thus weakens the correlation between average ratings and sales. This
is supported by of previous studies that review manipulations increase the risks of
consumers (Zhao et al., 2013), and the updated beliefs make manipulated rating to
eventually lose its effect and even backfire the manipulators.
To sum up, in this chapter, we empirically investigate the relationship between
review manipulation and the cumulative sales, and its potential consequence. The
results could better illustrate the performance of this strategy and the consequences of
adopting it.
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Chapter 8 Discussion
8.1 Results and Conclusions
In this thesis, we attempt to address the following questions: Whether review
manipulations are workable as marketing strategies? How would consumers respond
to different manipulations? Apparently, previous literature fails to answer the two
questions. The mechanism of how review manipulation influences consumers was
verified in the four subsequent studies. The results of our hypotheses are listed in
Table 15.
(Insert Table 15 here)
To guarantee that our analysis is not divorced from the reality, we first explored
consumers’ views of review manipulations. In the exploratory study, we interviewed
16 experienced online consumers about their knowledge and attitudes toward the
three popular manipulation strategies. The records of interviews show that consumers
have the general knowledge of different categories of manipulations. Besides, they
recognize these tactics as unethical behaviors and such strategies would negatively
influence their emotions (e.g. distrustfulness) as well as depress their willingness to
buy. The interviewees evaluated the three different strategies in terms of severity and
tolerance. Among the three, the majority of the interviewees show aversion toward
deleting/hiding negative reviews and posting fake positive reviews, because they
think these two tactics modify the intact information and essentially influences their
decisions. Besides, the interviewees also differently evaluate the incentive strategy,
which they think is less serious and sometimes tolerable. We further compared the
content of interviews with an existing theoretical framework (e.g. Information
Manipulation Theory) to shed light on the background knowledge and theoretical
direction of the quantitative analysis.
In study one, we surveyed consumers to investigate their attitudes about the three
manipulation patterns. The study mainly differentiates the three categories in terms of
perceived deceptiveness and ethicality. The results confirms our hypotheses that,
among the manipulation strategies, deleting/hiding negative reviews is commonly
rated as the most deceptive and most unethical, followed by adding positive reviews
and offering incentives to positive reviews. This suggests that reviews manipulated
by deleting strategy would evoke the most negative consequences if consumers
encountered and detect certain types of manipulation (i.e. fully aware of
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manipulations).
In the following study 2 we investigated how consumers cope with review
manipulations under a more realistic setting, where subjects were required to make
their own judgment in simulated field-experiment scenarios. Our analysis shows that
manipulated reviews would invoke more suspicion of deception compared with intact
reviews. This supports the findings in previous empirical study that consumers could
detect manipulations in rating (Hu et al., 2011b), but the manipulations cannot
significantly decrease purchase intentions. In other words, even though consumers
generally hold negative attitudes toward different manipulations, their purchase
intentions are not significantly reduced. The hypotheses of two stage moderations of
persuasion knowledge are also well supported. PK first enhances the suspicion
caused by manipulations. This is consistent with previous research that persuasion
knowledge drives individuals to be more sensitive to persuasion behaviors (e.g.
Kirmani and Zhu, 2007). It also moderates the consequences of suspicion in that it
decreases purchase intentions of focal products. In other words, persuasion
knowledge not only enables consumers to discover review manipulations, but also
lead them to more appropriately cope with them. Besides, our analysis also suggests
that, to the consumers with higher persuasion knowledge, the relationship between
manipulations and purchase intention is mediated by subjects’ suspicion. Through the
process, persuasion knowledge promotes consumers to suspect manipulated reviews
but also to reduce the negative influence of suspicion.
In study 3, we empirically investigate the influence of review manipulations on
product sales. We compare the predictive power of WOM on an independent
retailer’s own web store and on third-party social networks. The results support our
basic assumption that the average ratings on the company web store enjoy
comparatively less predictive power on sales than the response to the advertisements
on the public page. Thus, consumers discount the information obtained from the
reviews that they don’t trust, while their purchase decisions are primarily based on
their own evaluations. In addition, the changes in sales brought by manipulations are
also examined. Analysis of equation 2 indicates that manipulation (intensify)
positively correlates with the cumulative sales of focal products. In the real online
transactions, the deliberately designed review manipulations are effective marketing
strategies instead of causes of the antipathy. The results are consistent with the
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findings of Hu et al. (2011b) that consumers could only partially eliminate the
influence of fake reviews. More importantly, we also find that that after a sufficient
period, the general influence of review manipulations on sales decreases. We find that
the impact size of manipulation intensity drops from year 2012 to 2013, which is
consistent with the prediction of Dellarocas (2006).
To sum up, the four sequential studies investigate review manipulations from the
perspectives of consumers’ attitudes, response and effectiveness. The results could be
generalized as 1) consumers generally considered deleting manipulation as the most
intolerable strategy while incentive to positive reviews as the most acceptable; 2)
reviews with manipulations invoke more suspicion of deception than authentic user
reviews, but the purchase intentions are not significantly influence by manipulations;
3) persuasion knowledge both enhances the suspicion brought by manipulations and
weakens the negative influences on purchase intentions; and 4) review manipulations
are able to promote sales of products, but the benefits decreases overtime.
Our research contributes to the literature of review manipulations that we are the
very first to compare the three commonly adopted manipulations tactics. The unique
characters and properties of the three categories may diversify future research into
specific directions. The Information Manipulation Theory is extended to the context
of online review manipulations, based on which the revised framework in our study
provides a solid background framework for the future studies of review
manipulations.
Another important contribution is that we further investigate how review
manipulations shape consumers’ attitudes in online transactions. Prior literature
seldom studied how manipulations influence consumers’ purchase decisions, which
should be of great interest to managers and consumers. As far as I know, we are also
pioneering in studying the influence of review manipulations on transaction
willingness. Furthermore, we empirically verify the influence of manipulations on
product sales, as Mayzlin et al. (2013) appealed. The results of our studies would
shed light on further research such as online WOM, review manipulations and online
deceptions.
The persuasion knowledge literature is also enriched by our analyses. Prior PK
research generally focused on the offline interpersonal communications, while in our
study we introduce persuasion knowledge into a more complicated online
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environment. The results show that the Persuasion Knowledge Model remains valid
in such a context. Besides, persuasion knowledge is previously considered as the
trigger of negative reactions of consumers toward the persuasive attempts, as our
analysis indicates. But we also found surprising evidences on the contextual effects
that persuasion knowledge would also lead consumers to tolerate the “latent rules”
and react less negatively to the persuasive attempt. With the help of PKM, we
understand better the underlying mechanism of reactions invoked by review
manipulations.
To sum up, the thesis significantly contributes to the academic literature from the
perspectives of online WOM, review manipulations, Information Manipulation
Theory and Persuasion Knowledge Model. The results of our analysis also provide
rigorous academic suggestions to online shopping market.
8.2 Managerial Implications
Review manipulations are commonly used by online retailers and manufacturers
as a powerful marketing tool, which costs little but generates much benefit. These
benefits popularized this marketing behavior among e-tailers. On the other hand,
these behaviors are generally considered as deceptive and unethical by consumers
and regulators. It is believed that once direct evidence of these behaviors is obtained,
the manipulators may suffer from consequences such as loss of credibility or
prosecution. Although the retailers elaborately disguise the manipulated reviews in
order to be persuasive, the popularity of review manipulation still offers shoppers a
golden opportunity to learn the knowledge as well as protecting their own rights. As
buyers’ knowledge and experiences improve, the magic power of these strategies may
eventually fade away. Therefore, one of the most challenging questions is whether
these strategies are effective or even backfire? Although introduced by previous
literature, few studies have examined these questions from the perspective of
consumers, i.e., how would consumers think of different manipulation strategies and
how would they respond to them?
Our analysis shows that the consumers’ knowledge and attitudes toward
manipulations vary across different tactics. Among them, deleting is commonly
perceived as most negative one, while incentive as the least negative one. The
uniqueness of each strategy determines its hazards to the consumers and development
of e-market. Comparing with adding fake reviews and offering incentives, deleting
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negative reviews is not only the most misleading but also enjoys the highest difficulty
to be detected. As our interviewees mentioned “these behaviors disguise the crucial
negative WOM and violate their rights to know, which unethically lead them to make
inferior deals”. In other words, deleting distorts the reference value of online WOM
to the greatest extent and its influence cannot be easily ruled out. This “nuclear
weapon” may lead to the most severe consequences. Therefore, the market regulators
should be paid more attentions to the implementation of the harmful tactic.
Furthermore, offering incentives for positive reviews are relatively tolerable
from the perspective of consumers. In contrast to the other two tactics, offering
incentives to consumers may slightly increase product ratings, but may not totally
change the essence of the review, as most consumers would not recommend a poor
product just for a small compensation. Therefore, the incented review should still be
considered as informative and objective. Moreover, consumers may not consider
offering incentives as deceptions but as remediation for service-failure, since it is a
voluntary activity and the manipulated reviews are still generated by consumers. If
managed appropriately, such manipulations could help promote the quality of online
shopping services. Therefore, e-commerce operators may adopt this strategy with
caution, and regulators need to monitor the incentives in case of inappropriate
variants such as harassment and intimidation.
Our study also suggests that review manipulations can effectively increase sales
without serious consequences in a short term, but we strongly suggest that the
manipulators should stop using them. Prior literature claims that review
manipulations increase both risks of online shopping (Zhao et al, 2013) and costs of
e-retailers (Dellarocas, 2006). On one hand, consumers equipped with knowledge of
manipulations generally cast doubts on positive online WOM or even sometimes
become over-sensitive (i.e. consider intact reviews as manipulated). This has been
referred to as the generalized suspicion (e.g. Darke et al., 2007). The loss of
confidence in online WOM may deteriorate the environment of online market. In
other words, the increased risks force consumers to be cautious about the review
pitfalls and increase the costs of consumers. On the other hand, once consumers
recognize the manipulations, the negative influence would spill over to other similar
merchants. Non-manipulators also have to pay more to maintain their reputations and
endure the loss of review credibility. The rat race among e-retailers may induce
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non-manipulators to engage in review manipulations and increase the resources spent
on manipulating reviews. In a long run, fierce competitions require manipulators to
invest more on these unethical behaviors, which significantly endangers the healthy
development of e-commerce.
There is also some bad news for the manipulators. Consumers generally hold the
belief that independent retailers are less trustworthy than well-known retailers and
third-party platform providers. According to our analysis, the influence of average
rating on the retailer’s web store (with more manipulation) cannot catch that of WOM
on a third-party platform that has less manipulation. Besides, the analysis also shows
the decreasing effect of review manipulations overtime. Even though the increased
ratings significantly increase sales, given sufficient time, consumers would
eventually notice them and adjust their reliance on the suspected WOM. Our analysis
shows no evidence that manipulations would significantly reduce sales, but we
strongly believe that the consequences caused by the bad reputation would gradually
offset the profits cumulated in the early stage. Furthermore, with the enhancement of
related laws and regulations as well as emergence of experienced consumers, the
increasing competitions and costs of manipulations also remarkably change its
performance. Therefore, review manipulations, especially adding fake reviews and
deleting negative reviews, may not be the optimal strategy for retailers.
Policy makers and market regulators should also pay special attention to review
manipulations. On one hand, according to our analysis, review manipulations are
commonly considered as unethical activities whose victims are average consumers.
They cannot completely filter out the “noise” in online WOM and consumers using
the distorted information might not be able to make optimal choices. The utility loss
forces consumers to stay alert to the pitfalls and gradually lose confidence in
e-commerce. On the other hand, consumers with generalized suspicion may
depreciate the high-quality online WOM of the honest e-retailers. This may lead to a
vicious cycle in which honest sellers are forced to participate in manipulating WOM.
Globally, the vicious cycle definitely impedes the healthy development of e-market.
To prevent such consequences, policy makers and regulators should devote sufficient
resources to ensure the functioning of the fair market mechanism. For instance, as the
strategy of deleting negative reviews is more damaging to consumer welfare,
regulations and laws should forbid this kind of behavior and increase the costs of
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such a strategy. Therefore, we could suppress the wide-spread unethical strategies in
order to protect the healthy development of e-market.
8.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Among the research limitations of this research, a major issue is external validity.
In our research, the focal products are mostly apparels, one classic category of
experienced products. Online WOM may play a different role in evaluating search
products because information could be obtained from multiple sources (King and
Balasubramanian, 1994). Our study 2 was done using student subjects, which may
influence the generalization of our findings. Student samples are suggested to be
more active in online shopping and more likely to use persuasion knowledge
(Campbell and Kirmani, 2000), while the average consumers may not be as sensitive
as the samples that we used in our study. Cautions should be exercised in
generalizing these findings to other product categories and the average consumers.
Future research may examine the generalizability of the phenomenon to other product
categories and other subject populations.
Another key limitation in our research is that we cannot empirically examine the
influence of manipulation on attitudes change across different tactics. One of the
biggest problems is that the extent of manipulation by different tactics remains to be
clarified. Hence, the degree of manipulation among the three tactics is not
comparable, which significantly limits the effectiveness of inter-scenario experiment.
For instance, in study 2, because the efforts devoted into manipulations are not
comparable among the 3 tactics, we cannot rigorously compare the influence of
manipulation across them. The inter-tactic tests could only be done unless the levels
of manipulation are the same. Therefore, in future research, of the extent of
manipulativeness among the tactics should be explored, as manipulation strategies
may influence consumers’ attitudes in different ways. For example, the difference
between “adding one 5-star fake review” and “adding one 4-star fake reviews” may
be interesting.
In addition, future research could improve the measurement of manipulation
intensity. In our research, even though the approximation of relative manipulation
intensity is relative valid and robust, it is difficult to accurately quantify the extent of
review manipulations. Indirect measurement may include other factors that affect the
accuracy of the measurement.. We strongly suggest that future researchers gather
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direct evidence or detailed information of review manipulation and develop a more
accurate proxy of the manipulation intensity.
Future research could also further investigate the distinctions between incentive
strategy and the other two. In our analysis, we treat all the three types of
manipulations as homogenous, that is, they are all deceptive and unethical marketing
activities. However, the interesting point is that some of our interviewees considered
incentive manipulation different from adding and deleting. They show that,
comparing with adding and deleting, incentive turned to be much tolerable and
acceptable in the opinions of consumers. Besides, the results also suggest that
incentive is rated as far less deceptive and unethical than the other two. To explain
the distinction, we believe the essential differences between incentives and other
manipulation strategies should be highlighted. For instance, should offering
incentives be treated as deception that is harmful to consumers or service-failure
recovery that is beneficial? Hence, future researchers are encouraged to further
investigate the distinctions between incentive manipulations and the other two
strategies.
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Appendix A Discussion Guide For Online Shoppers
1. Warm Up
o Gender, Age, Occupation
2. Internet usage and online shopping experience (10 minutes)
Objectives:
- To find out his/her online shopping experience
- To understand his/her usage of online product reviews
o Online Shopping Experience
‐ Have you ever purchased products on the Internet?
‐ If yes to the above question, from which websites you purchase the most often?
Which categories of products have you purchased the most often (books,
electronics, clothing, toys, movies……)? Probe motivations of online
shopping
‐ How many times have you purchased the products online in the past 3
months?
‐ How much money have you spent on online shopping per year? Please
estimate.
o Usage of Online Product Reviews
‐ Have you ever read the online product reviews before making purchase
decision?
‐ What type of information are you interested in? (+ or – reviews, reputation of
the seller…)
‐ How much do you rely on the online product reviews for making the purchase
decisions?

Probe why.

3. Suspicion and awareness of different manipulations strategies (10 minutes)
Objectives:
- To understand consumers’ suspicion about the seller manipulations of
online product reviews
- To find out their awareness of different manipulation strategies
o Usage of Online Product Reviews
-

Are you suspicious of manipulations by a seller (do you feel something
wrong with the online product reviews)?

-

If yes to the above question, the extent to which you are suspicious about
the occurrence of the seller manipulations. Use 1-10 point scale to
describe perceived suspicion of the online product reviews (1 – not at all
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suspicious, 10 – extremely suspicious).
Probe what are the cues that make you suspicious about the occurrence of
the manipulations (too many positive comments, high ratings, incentive to
encourage the positive postings…)
-

If no to the question, explain why you are not suspicious of manipulations
by a seller.

o Awareness of different manipulation strategies
-

What strategies do you know the sellers would use to manipulate the
online product reviews?

Evaluation of different manipulation strategies (20 minutes)
Objectives:
- To find out respondents’ responses toward different manipulation
strategies
Rotate order of different manipulation strategies when doing the interview with
different respondents.
Strategy 1: Incentive Manipulation
An online company employs various tactics for encouraging customers to create
online product reviews by offering some type of incentive in exchange for
content.
Strategy 2: Deleting Negative Reviews
An online company automatically filters out (delete) negative consumer reviews.
Strategy 3: Adding Positive Reviews
An online company posts positive reviews for its own product. For example, in
February 2004, an error at Amazon.com’s Canadian site caused Amazon to
mistakenly reveal book reviewer identities. It was apparent that a number of these
reviews were written by the books’ own publishers and authors.
Can lead them to freely talk about these 3 strategies
o Would you tell me your overall impression about each manipulation strategy?
Which one do you think is most negative?
o Rank the perceived deceitfulness among the three (隐蔽性，欺骗的严重性). Probe
why.
o Rank the perceived ethicality among the three. Probe why.
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o Rank the perceived ease of detectability. Probe why.
o If such a manipulation strategy is applied by the online store you usually shop,
how much would it affect your attitude toward the seller?

(trust, confidence, or

stay away, or even blacklist them, NWOM to other consumers…)
o Influence on the purchase decisions. Use 1-10 point scale to describe the impact
of strategy on your purchase intention (1- not at all influence; 10 – totally change
my decision)
o Do you feel it is fair or ethical to manipulate reviews? How would you feel about
regulations by government or industries?

CONCLUSION AND WRAP UP

60

APPENDIX B

AN EXAMPLE OF THE SCENARIO DESIGN

Product Details
ABC Brand outdoor shoes
Item Weight: 2 pounds
Shipping Weight: 2 pounds
ASIN: B*******Y
Price: HK$580.00
Please check shipping policy
here!

Please find the most recent 6 reviews (the reviews should be ordered by their
posting dates) here. For more reviews, please go to the next page.
Some kinks, March 7, 2013 By Michael L Reynolds
The shoes are very comfortable, even though they run small. Even after I returned a pair and got a
size bigger, the left shoe was tight on my big toe. After two weeks of wear, they have loosened
enough to where this is not a problem.
The shoes are amazing, January 9, 2013 By asdf%#0
The shoes are amazingly good! And it’s perfectly comfortable! I would like to buy another pair
just for my dad!!
Great Hiking Shoe, January5, 2013 By asdf%#0
I purchased these for a 10 day hiking trip and they were perfect. They are extremely comfortable
and durable! What a good deal! Trust me! These are the shoes that you need if you are a serious
hiker! You can take my words for it!
tight fit uncomfortable, same size has always been good for me, January 4, 2013
By acadia hiker
This is the second pair of ABC shoes I have purchased. The first pair has been great. This pair is
uncomfortable in the same size.
Replaced My 10 Year Old Pair, December 25, 2012 By asdf%#0
This is my 2nd pair in 10 years. These shoes are amazing. Comfortable, dry, sturdy and light.
Can't ask for anything better and the fact that my 1st pair lasted as long as they did is
recommendation enough!
Comfortable, but not durable., December 24, 2012 By Kevin
I used this shoe hiking around and playing disc golf. Less than two weeks and about 10 miles into
using the shoe, it developed around a 3 inch rip on the outside of the shoe. I promptly set them
back for a refund. They were very comfortable, but obviously I had concerns with the durability.
This material is designed for subjects in adding group. In the scenario, a consumer named
“asdf%#0” repeatedly post positive reviews using extreme words.
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APPENDIX C

FIGURES

Figure 1 An Example of Adding Manipulation

Figure 2 Conceptual Framework
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Figure 3 Mediating Effects of Suspicion

Figure 4

Two Stage Moderating Effects
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APPENDIX D TABLES
Table 1 Awareness of Different Manipulation Tactics
Manipulation Tactics

Example quotes

Incentive

- Once you buy products from a website, they will give you discounts in return for good reviews. (F5)
- Sometimes, the seller will privately contact buyers with special offers in return for good reviews. Or, they might harass and bother the
buyers, in an attempt to get them to change their negative reviews to become positive. (F10)
- The seller may bribe the customer as payment for good reviews. (F11)
- The seller might even directly give cash rebate or send gifts, in the hopes that buyers will leave good reviews. (M3)
- The seller of Taobao will contact me when I left a negative review and promise to offer me extra benefits if I remove the negative
reviews. (M5)

Adding

- When there are users who repeatedly post good reviews, or the product does not appear very popular yet, the only reviews are all
positive and do not raise any issues, the reviewers appear to be less genuine. (F2)
- I have heard that sellers employ professional shill reviewers in order to increase their positive reputation by posting more good
reviews. (F5)
- The sellers either pay professional shill reviewers to leave good reviews or they themselves create multiple accounts under false
names and leave positive reviews on their own products. (M1)
- The seller may ask his close friends or relatives to leave good reviews, in an attempt to convince potential customers to buy the
product. (M3)

Deleting

-

Some sellers will deliberately highlight the positive reviews, while putting aside the negative reviews. (F9)
If it is on the seller’s own website, they will manipulate the buyers’ view by deleting any negative reviews behind the scene. (F10)
In order to block the negative reviews, they will delete the negative reviews or edit them to become positive. (F11)
When they have connections to the administrator of the website they are selling their products on, they can get the assistance when
deleting or editing any negative reviews. However, the probability of this situation occurring is very low, as only few seller ever have
such connections. (M2)
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Table 2 Suspicion of Online Manipulation Practices
Cues for Detection

Example Quotes

The quality of the
content

- Finding that most of the good reviews contain similar or repeated content gives the impression of fabricated reviews. Likewise,
excessively harsh reviews are likely written by competitors. (F6)
- When you buy a product, you tend to look at different sellers offering the same products. If you find out that many of the reviews
contain similar phases, content and tone, then they must be fabricated by professional “shill” reviewers. (F7)
- When the same review is posted by different reviewers, at a glance, you can tell they are fake. (F8)
- Reviews that have been repeated, are too short, or have given extremely high ratings are not believable, and likely copied and pasted.
(F9)
- Very short phrases like “good” and “very good.” Or extreme words. For an expensive or medium-priced product, if they are described
as without comparisons or substitutes, then we can tell. Copy and paste of whole sections are also problematic. (M3)

The quantity of the
reviews

- If there are repeated purchases by the same person, followed by reviews and not showing the goods having been returned, they must
friends of the seller trying to help shore up its reputation. (F1)
- Buy your own products to increase sales volume to attract more sales, but there are not many reviewers only a few reviews. (F2)
- Within one minute, the person produces many reviews and all of them are positive. The person is likely a false reviewer. (F8)

The mismatch
between reviews,
seller reputation and
trade record

- If a seller’s rating rises rapidly within a short period, it must be manipulated. If they been in business or on the shelf for not long, it is
difficult to believe. (F1)
- A prospective buyer will look at the seller reputation first, and if there are many good reviews despite a poor reputation, the seller will
appear very suspicious. If many people are buying this product, then the good reviews are more believable. But if few people are
buying the product at all, and there are still good reviews, then the reviews become quite questionable. (F9)
- Sometimes all the reviews are good ones, not even a medium rating. That is not realistic. (F10)
- When you buy a product, you have some basic knowledge. If some reviews are very different from your expectations or from other
reviews, they seem nonsense. (M4)

The identities of
reviewers

- Upon seeing so many repeated reviews by the same person, the reader will instantly become suspicious. (F2)
- You can tell from the registered user IDs. We mostly give ourselves meaningful names. Some IDs are just random combinations of
letters and numbers. I typically skip those reviews. (F4)
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Table 3 How Consumers Perceive Different Manipulation Strategies
Manipulation tactics

Most deceptive

Incentive
Adding
Deleting
All equally significant
All equally insignificant

1
3
11
1
0

Most
detectable
6
7
3
0
0

Most
unethical
1
2
10
3
0

Most negative
impact
0
1
9
5
1

Table 4 Multi-item Scales and Reliabilities
Measurement Scale
Perceived Deceptiveness
1.
2.
3.

Reliability

Accurate/Misleading
Truthful/Deceptive
Factual/Distorted

0.930

Ethicality
1.
2.
3.
4.

Fair/Unfair
Just/Unjust
Acceptable/Unacceptable
Morally right/Not morally right

0.927

Ease of detection
1.
2.

Detectable/Undetectable
Distinguishable/Undistinguishable

0.909

Table 5 Comparison of Mean Scores Among Three Strategies
Adding
(a)

Deleting
(b)

Incentive
(c)

Perceived Deceptiveness

6.11bc
(0.070)

6.28ac
(0.052)

4.54ab
(0.082)

Unethicality

6.09b*c
(0.074)

6.22a*c
(0.056)

4.64ab
(0.100)

Ease of Detection

5.22bc
(0.100)

5.52ac
(0.086)

4.35ab
(0.142)

Note: a/b/c – significant difference at 95% confidence interval, two-tailed t-test;
a*/b*/c* – significant difference at 90% confidence interval, two-tailed t-test;
Standard errors are given in the parentheses.
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics and Zero-order Correlation for All Variables
Mean

S.D.

1

2

1.Purchase Intention

3.67

1.16

1.00

2.Suspicion

4.17

1.03

-0.51*

1.00

3.Persuasion Knowledge

4.46

0.73

-0.10

0.29*

1.00

4.Review Involvement

5.02

0.87

0.01

-0.16*

0.22*

5.Gender

0.65

0.48

0.06

-0.02

-0.19*

4

5

0.11

Note: *p<0.05; All variables were measured on seven-point scales.

Table 7 OLS Results for the Two Stage Model
First Stage Model

Second Stage Model

Dependent Variable

Suspicion

Purchase Intention

Gender

0.11

0.20

Review Involvement

-0.27***

-0.15**

Adding Dummy (X1)

0.74***

0.42**

Deleting Dummy (X2)

0.32*

0.40**

Incentive Dummy (X3)

0.67***

0.21

Persuasion Knowledge (PK)

0.11

0.18*

Suspicion

-0.68***

X1*PK

0.75**

X2*PK

0.38*

X3*PK

0.27

PK*Suspicion

Adj. R-Square

0.12*

0.235

Note: *p<0.1,**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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0.280

Table 8 Path Analysis of Simple Effects
Moderator
variable

Stage
First

Effect
Second

Direct

Indirect

Total

-0.76***

-0.35*

Adding Path
Persuasion knowledge
High

1.28***

-0.59***

0.42**

Low

0.20

-0.76***

0.42**

Differences

1.09***

0.17**

0.00

-0.15

0.25

-0.61***

-0.61***

High

Deleting Path
0.59***
-0.59***

0.40**

-0.35**

0.05

Low

0.04

-0.76***

0.40**

-0.03

0.37

0.56*

0.17**

0.00

-0.32

-0.32

Differences
High

Incentive Path
0.86***
-0.59***

0.21

Low

0.47

-0.76***

0.21

-0.36

-0.15

0.31

0.17**

0.00

-0.15

-0.15

Differences

-0.51***

-0.30

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 for bias corrected confidence interval;
5000 times bootstrapping analysis.

Table 9 Sales and User Reviews at Own Websites and Social Networks
N=555
Variable

Percentile
Mean

Std. dev.

0.10

0.50

0.90

9

49

231
139

Product
Sale

94.04

142.39

Price

88.44

48.76

39

79

Discount Rate

28.27%

13.09%

15.40%

25.65%

OwnVolume

94.37

98.67

10

66

OwnRating

4.74

0.32

No. of likes

43.97

45.31

6

22

120

No. of reads

7776.21

5219.98

3013

6530

14077

0.76

0.92

43.75%

Web Store
4.50

4.80

213
4.96

Public Page

Ratio of likes (in%)

0.07

0.03

2.08

Note: The table reports the summary statistics for user reviews for 555 promoted products
and their 31 days cumulative sales from year 2011-2013.
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Table 10 Estimated Results for Equation 1

Extra
Coupon
Time Limit
Price
Discount (in %)
Gender
Brand
Year
Theme
STD Volume
STD Rating
R-Square

Review Rating and Volume

Third Rating and Volume

21.26
(16.482)
1.73
(8.928)
-12.32***
(3.175)
-0.58***
(0.123)
1.01**
(0.497)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
𝐎𝐰𝐧𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐣
61.46***
(11.678)
11.13
(7.500)
0.373

33.87*
(20.269)
25.94**
(10.838)
-21.33***
(5.485)
-0.84***
(0.162)
1.34**
(0.530)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝𝐖𝐎𝐌𝐣
60.81***
(11.847)
13.28**
(5.160)
0.356

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Regression estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable in all the specification is the 30
days cumulative sales of promoted product. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.

Table 11 Estimated Results for Equation 2

STD MI

15.12***
(4.17)

Volume is controlled
22.41
(16.645)
-4.27
(9.199)
-12.90***
(3.293)
-0.60***
(0.124)
1.18**
(0.511)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
55.15***
(10.610)
17.11**
(6.129)

R-Square

0.239

0.365

Extra
Coupon
Time Limit
Price
Discount (in %)
Gender
Brand
Year
Theme
STD OwnVolume

Volume is not controlled
36.19*
(20.759)
5.38
(9.245)
-17.75***
(4.767)
-0.88***
(0.172)
1.64**
(0.592)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Regression estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable in all the specification is the 30
days cumulative sales of promoted product. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.
71

Table 12 Estimated Results for Equation 3
Control volume on public page
𝐗 𝐢𝐣
Price
Extra
Coupon
Time Limit
DiscountRate (in %)
ThirdVolume

-0.14***
(0.032)
19.19
(16.551)
13.65
(10.279)
-18.49***
(5.040)
0.68
(0.493)
62.08***
(12.235)

OwnVolume
Time1
Time3
Year
Gender
Brand
STD MI
MI*Time1
MI*Time3

R-Square

15.66
(24.194)
31.93**
(15.380)
Yes
Yes
Yes
86.06**
(25.298)
-79.88**
(25.565)
-107.35***
(28.769)
0.360

Control volume on web store
-0.09**
(0.028)
10.28
(13.977)
-4.88
(9.799)
-10.19**
(3.033)
-0.42
(0.505)

59.83***
(10.995)
56.92**
(25.429)
91.35***
(21.112)
Yes
Yes
Yes
127.30***
(28.758)
-108.41**
(30.318)
-113.63***
(30.811)
0.382

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Regression estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable in all the specification is the 30
days cumulative sales of promoted product. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 13 Robust Check One
Extra
Coupon
Time Limit
Price
Discount (in %)
STD OwnVolume
Gender
Brand
Year
Theme
Time1

Equation 2
26.08
(16.639)
-2.10
(9.285)
-12.60***
(2.925)
-0.60***
(0.126)
1.14**
(0.511)
54.61***
(11.095)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Time3
STD MI

13.63**
(4.262)

MI*Time1
MI*Time3
R-Square

0.359

Equation 3
28.89*
(16.770)
2.84
(9.714)
-12.38***
(3.154)
-0.63***
(0.129)
1.14**
(0.565)
58.57***
(11.361)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
139.13
(95.362)
239.05**
(90.315)
58.22**
(20.578)
-184.69
(122.710)
-260.47**
(122.268)
0.374

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Regression estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable in all the specification is the 30
days cumulative sales of promoted product. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 14 Robust Check Two
Extra
Coupon
Time Limit
Price
Discount (in %)
Gender
Brand
Year
Theme
Time1

Equation 2
21.06
(16.135)
-5.67
(8.688)
-11.51***
(2.833)
-0.55***
(0.117)
0.96*
(0.489)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Time3
STD MI

0.79***
(0.140)

MI*Time1
MI*Time3
R-Square

0.397

Equation 3
24.42
(15.799)
3.77
(9.161)
-10.33***
(4.767)
-0.52***
(0.118)
0.800
(0.538)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
15.81
(27.904)
89.82**
(27.096)
1.00***
(0.242)
-0.25
(0.284)
-0.56**
(0.262)
0.419

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Regression estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable in all the specification is the 30
days cumulative sales of promoted product. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 15 General Results Conclusion
Hypothesis
H1A
H1B
H1C

Study 1

Among the three manipulation strategies, hiding/deleting unfavorable messages (violations of quantity)
(H2A), followed by anonymously adding positive messages (violations of quality) will be rated as the most
deceptive (H2B), and offering rewards to consumers who post favorable messages (violations of both
quality and manner) (H2C).

Study 2

Study 3

Supported
Supported
Supported

H2

Hiding/deleting unfavorable messages would be treated as the most unethical strategy among the three
manipulation strategies.

H3

Online product reviews with manipulations will invoke more suspicion than those without manipulations

Supported

H4

The amount of suspicion has a negative impact on consumers’ purchase intention.

Supported

H5

With the same average rating, the purchase intention of product with review manipulations should be lower
than that of the product without manipulation.

Not Supported

H6

The relationship between review manipulation and purchase intention is mediated by suspicion of
deceptions.

Supported

H7

Persuasion knowledge would enhance suspicion toward manipulated reviews.

Partially
Supported

H8

The negative impact of perceived deceptiveness on purchase intention toward the focal product is more
pronounced among low PK consumers than high PK consumers.

Supported

H9

Review manipulation would positively influence the purchase intention toward focal products.

Supported

H10

The impact size of manipulation intensity on sales would decrease overtime

Partially
Supported
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